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ABSTRACT
As more and more families deviate from the typical "one father, one
mother, and children" family form, societies will have varying reactions to
the cultural and legal implications of these "new-type families." Israel
provides a fascinating case study in the experience of such families for two
reasons. First, Israel has among the highest per capita populations of
identified gay and lesbian individuals and families made up of homosexual
principals. Second, and more importantly, the Israeli justice system affords
ever-increasing bundles of rights to such families. It is thus possible to
dissociate cultural and legal barriers to acceptance in a way not possible in
most other countries.
In this article, we study several such families through personal
interviews and come to the conclusion that although legal equality is a near
reality, cultural equality is not. Interestingly, this is not the case due to a
general cultural antipathy towards such families but instead because such
families are left unidentified, without adequate terminology to reflect or
categorize them, and therefore are seen as invisible nonentities in the
greater Israeli society. This issue creates a gap between the "authenticity"
with which new-type families live and the non-recognition with which they
are met.
This article explores the nexus of language, social identity, and legal
status for new-type families. By incorporating notions of the theory of
recognition together with redistribution ideas, it seeks to promote the legal
reform that would provide those families the recognition they deserve and
demand.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a wonderful Israeli children's book, a young boy spends a sleepless
night before celebrating his birthday in school. The tradition in his class is
for each child to tell a story about his or her family to the class as part of
the birthday celebration. Most of the children's birthdays had come and
gone, and each had told the story of a unique family: a single mother,
divorced parents, an adopted child, two mothers, two fathers and a mother,
and so on. The boy, who heard his teacher remark that she "had never had
such a diverse class," felt anxious about sharing his "standard story" of two
parents, a brother, and a cat.' While the story is charming in the way it
turns tradition upside-down, the truth is that new-type families-those
1. YEHUDA ATLAS & YAEL MISHALI, KOL ECHAD VEA-MISHPACHA SHELO
[EVERYONE AND HIS FAMILY] (2000).
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which differ from the standard nuclear family-differ from the norm and
occupy an uncomfortable place in both Israeli culture and the legal system.
In this article, we explore the difference between cultural acceptance and
legal acceptance for "new-type families" and engage in a linguistic study to
show that the inability to adequately describe these families hampers
cultural acceptance.
Israel has the highest number of children of homosexual parents per
capita in the world.2 This may be attributed, in part, to the emphasis that
Israeli society traditionally places on the family institution, regardless of
form.3 As a result of this large population, the topic of gay/lesbian
parenting is now entering public discourse and generating heated debate.
While a growing number of households in Israel offer an alternative to the
typical concept of family, those involving homosexual parents are
fundamentally different from the "traditional" family in part because of the
inherent inability for both partners in a gay couple to become the genetic
parents of a child. Since surrogacy is not available for same-sex couples in
the Israeli legal system and adoption is legally problematic, family
formation usually requires involving a third party. The process of
becoming a parent in a steady, long-term relationship with a life partner
does not allow for the same organic family relationship that heterosexual
couples enjoy. Gay parents may give birth to children with their partners
as a result of a joint decision, may adopt the children of their partner, may
wish to adopt children together, or may involve a third party for the
purpose of procreation. The identity of these new families, even as self-
2. See David K. Flaks, Gays, Lesbians, and the Meaning of Family: Judicial
Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 345 (1994) (giving
statistics on the number of homosexual parents in the United States); GARY J. GATES ET
AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (2007), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute//publications/
FinalAdoptionReport.pdf (reporting results from a study on adoption and foster care by
lesbian and gay parents which used census data and other government surveys to
estimate the number of adopted and fostered children living with lesbian and gay
parents in the United States and to provide a demographic portrait of these families);
see also Moshe Ronen & Ronen Tal, Lo Mitcabdim Lehazminchem [Don't Intend to
Invite You], YEDIOT ACHARONOT [24 HOURS MAGAZINE], Feb. 2, 2007, at 3. The
problem of estimation, and the resulting range of estimates for the number of gay and
lesbian parents, is not unique to Israel. For example, in 1994 it was estimated that
between 1.5 and 5 million lesbian mothers and between 1 and 3 million gay fathers
lived in the United States. The total number of children with a lesbian or gay parent
range from 6 million to 14 million. Id. See generally Irit Rosenblum & Nurit Peleg,
Report on Family's Situation in Israel 2007, http://www.newfamily.org.il/cat/16
(estimating that gay and lesbian couples account for more than 18,000 families and that
they are raising between 2000 to 3000 children). Accurate figures are hard to obtain
because not all parents use known organizations to adopt or facilitate procreation.
3. See Goel Pinto, Ga'avat Hamishpacha [Family Pride], HAARETZ, Nov. 10,
2006, at Galeria 3 (describing a meeting of a group of homosexuals, in which they
discussed whether their desire for a child is a genuine wish or whether it stems from
cultural impositions).
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described, is multi-faceted and affected by personal, societal, and legal
factors. These families give rise to multiple legal questions regarding
marriage, adoption, prenuptial agreements, and the ability to give such
arrangements legal validity.
Israel is quite progressive in the legal protection given to homosexual
individuals by providing a reasonable approximation of equality through
legislation and judicial review. Nevertheless, the absence of a recognizable
family status often leads to dissatisfaction among gays and lesbians in
alternative family settings concerning rights, benefits, and the way they are
treated by society and the state.4 Their frustration reveals the gap between
the reality of new-type families and a normative environment that often
ignores their existence.5 The particular frustrations felt among gay and
lesbian families also imply a possible dissociation between advancing the
rights of gay and lesbians, as individuals, and addressing new problems
associated with the status and rights of alternative families.6
Consider the story of Jonathan Danielowitz, a homosexual flight
attendant who worked for El Al, the national Israeli airline. Danielowitz
asserted the right to receive a free ticket for his partner, in accordance with
the company policy towards heterosexual employees. The Israeli Supreme
Court granted him that right on the basis of the legal prohibition against
discrimination among employees and the general right of equality.7 This
decision was no doubt a pivotal point in the Court's acknowledgment of
gay rights. Nevertheless, ten years later, the atmosphere at a conference
convened to celebrate the event was one of discontent, derived not
necessarily from a sense of inequality or victimization, but from a desire
for recognition. 8 Conference participants noted the ability of gays and
lesbians to creatively establish new family forms, but at the same time
4. See DICTIONARY OF NEW FAMILY, NEW FAMILY ORGANIZATION, available at
http://www.newfamily.org.il/rec/72 [in Hebrew] (defining "single parent" and
recognizing the clearly defined status of single lesbian mothers as "single parents").
5. See Michal Tamir (Itzhaki), Hazchut Leshivion Shel Homosexualim Velesbiot
[Equality of Gays and Lesbians], 45 HAPRACLIT 94, 127 (2000) (pointing to the gap in
Israel between the relatively progressive legal advances concerning homosexuals vis-A-
vis their unsatisfactory social situation).
6. See John Bowe, Gay Donor or Gay Dad?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006
(Magazine), at 66 (suggesting that this gap is not unique to Israel and quoting an expert
who partly attributes this lag to the "natural inertia in the legislative process" to offend
socially conservative voters); see also Ronen & Tal, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing the
special challenges new-type families face, for example, the commonly expressed view
that a child needs "a mom and a dad").
7. See HCJ 721/94 El-Al Israel Airlines Ltd v. Danielowitz [1994] IsrSC 48(5)
749 (finding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). See ISRAEL LAW
REPORT 1992-1994, at 478-522 (Jonathan Davidson ed., 2002), for an English
translation.
8. Dr. Tamir attended the conference held at the Faculty of Law, Tel-Aviv
University, January 11, 2005.
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raised questions such as "why can't we get married and adopt children?"
The common explanations regarding orthodox religious sensibilities, 9 the
current compromise between the religious and secular sectors, and the need
to avoid antagonism were deemed irrelevant to justify the state's continued
position of neutrality.
Israel provides a fascinating case study in the experience of such families
not only because of the relatively high proportion of families made up of
homosexual principals in its general population, but because the Israeli
justice system's ever-increasing bundle of rights to such families makes it
possible to dissociate cultural and legal barriers to acceptance in a way not
possible in most other countries. In this article, we study several such
families through personal interviews. Using sociolinguistic tools, we focus
on the linguistic expressions that gay and lesbian parents choose in
portraying their family situations in an attempt to identify the personal,
social, or legal gaps reflected in their descriptions.10 This crucial query
finds its impetus in widely-accepted arguments about the inextricable and
multidirectional links between language and social identity.
We find that although legal equality is a near reality, cultural equality is
not. Interestingly, this is the case not because of a cultural antipathy
towards such families (though this might well exist in some cases), but
rather because such families are left unidentified, without adequate
terminology to reflect or categorize them. As a result, they are considered
to be invisible nonentities in the greater Israeli society. Such a finding
certainly has implications for efforts to integrate new-type families into the
cultural mainstream throughout the world. Against this background, it
strikes us that the well-known and well-developed jurisprudential notions
of equality are insufficient for dealing with the changing notion of what
constitutes a family. Clearly, new-type families are not "equal" to classic
9. See HCJ 8988/06 (Jer) Meshi-Zahav v. Commander in Chief [2006] (discussing
the need to reconcile the right to hold a gay parade in Jerusalem and the negative
feelings such a parade invokes among orthodox Jews). The Court did not have to make
a determination in this case, as the litigants reached a compromise. Id. See also Sheera
Claire Frankel, Religious Leaders Protest Gay Parade, JERUSALEM POST, July 4, 2006,
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&c
id=1150885916950 (examining the hostile reactions to and condemnation of the gay
community's plan to hold the annual 2006 gay pride parade in Jerusalem); Neta Sela,
Gay Parade Leaves Jerusalem?, YNET, July 7, 2006, http://www.ynetnews.
com/articles/0,7340,L-3272408,00.html (stating that even a compromise to hold a
small-scale event, which was approved by the police, came under attack in the High
Court of Justice).
10. See Bowe, supra note 6, at 66 (suggesting that the word "spouse" as used to
describe a partner in a heterosexual family has no equivalent in the context of same-sex
partners in alternative families). This linguistic inadequacy symbolizes the multi-
faceted social gap we are seeking to explore in the current paper. This deficiency is
amplified when referring to the partner of a gay biological father, or the biological
father of a child who is raised by two lesbians. Is he "more than an uncle but less than
a father?" Id.
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families and therefore legal principles such as "equality" or even
"substantive equality" fall short of capturing the multidimensional context
in which the status and self-identity of Israeli alternative families should be
viewed.
Using the results of our study, we analyze the complex situation of new-
type families in Israel in terms of recognition and, in doing so, illuminate
neglected aspects of the right to equality. The theory of recognition
challenges the liberal idea that one can develop self-identity in isolation
from others. It argues that the capacity to develop an interpretation of
one's needs and identity depends on processes of mutual recognition taking
place at three levels: family, society, and state. Proponents of this theory
pursue a positive difference approach in society and seek a world where
assimilation to dominant cultural norms is no longer the price of equal
respect. This concept is highly underdeveloped in Israel. While social
politics and liberal ideas of autonomy and equality are well established,
cultural politics is not as developed, and questions of recognition and
authenticity" are rarely raised.
Part II of this article describes the constitutional background of the right
to equality and the right to family in Israel. In addition, it provides a
historical review of gay rights in Israel with special attention to recent legal
developments and their implications for new-type families. This Part
shows that while recent legal developments advance gay rights, they have
yet to constitute recognition of new-type families. Part III introduces the
theory of recognition and hypothesizes that, in the absence of a defined
status or even terminology to describe new-type families in Israel, their
problematic situation cannot be fully captured by the liberal notion of
equality. Part IV explains our motivation for using a sociolinguistic prism
to examine issues concerning the identity and status of alternative families.
Part V details the methodology used in the study, including background
information about participants, the questionnaire used for data collection,
and categories of analysis. Part VI introduces our findings, which
concentrate on the explicit and implicit thematic content expressed by the
study participants, whose strongest concern stems from the absence of a
clear, recognizable-and thus definable-status to describe their authentic
position within the families they form. Based on the non-recognition our
study identifies, Part VII suggests shifting from a neutral to positive
difference approach, whereby parents in new-type families are viewed as
11. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM:
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 30 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994)
(explaining authenticity: "[t]here is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am
called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else's life. But
this notion gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point
of my life; I miss what being human is for me.").
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individuals who enrich society, rather than merely potential victims of
discrimination. By incorporating notions of the theory of recognition
together with redistribution ideas, Part VII seeks to promote the legal
reform that would provide those families the recognition they deserve and
demand. We then conclude in Part VIII that the power of gay families lies
in their ability to reshape the political, emotional, and legal understanding
of what family is. This reshaping is a prerequisite for building a sense of
positive difference, and in turn, recognition from the state, which will
further shape social attitudes. Thus, only legal recognition of the new-type
families, by enabling marriage, adoption, and prenuptial agreements, can
establish social esteem and achieve "solidarity."
II. BACKGROUND
Understanding the barriers to true equality for new-type families requires
an appreciation of the legal regime under which substantive rights and
remedies for violations of those rights are available. As the principals of
many such families are homosexual, this Part reviews the legal
development of gay and lesbian rights in Israel in both individual and
family domains.
Israeli courts use a two-step process to address constitutional issues.1
2
Courts first look for coverage-whether a specific infringement falls within
the scope of the constitutional right in question. If it does, courts look to
see if there is protection-namely whether, under the specific
circumstances of the case, the infringement meets the constitutional
demands for a remedy given the need to balance every right with
conflicting rights and interests.13
Historically, in the absence of a written constitution, human rights
developed through case law.14  The Israeli Supreme Court has always
interpreted statutes with the presumption that the Israeli Parliament (the
Knesset) intends to uphold basic human rights.' 5 Thus, an extensive body
12. See, e.g., HCJ 6427/02 The Movement for Quality Gov't in Isr. v. The Knesset
[2006] (Barak, C.J. opinion, 20) (explaining the levels of scrutiny the court uses in
addressing the constitutionality of a legal norm); HCJ 7052/03 Adalah - the Legal Ctr.
for the Arab Minority Rights in Isr. v. The Minister of Interior [2006] (Barak, C.J.
opinion, 18) (explaining the process the court uses in addressing constitutional
issues).
13. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah - the Legal Ctr. for the Arab Minority Rights in Isr. v. The
Minister of Interior (Barak, C.J. opinion, 18) (examining the law at issue to determine
whether the violation satisfies the requirements of the limitations clause which would
make the violation lawful and create no remedy).
14. See Itzhak Zamir, Administrative Law, in THE LAW OF ISRAEL: GENERAL
SURVEYS 51, 53-54 (Itzhak Zamir & Sylviane Colombo eds., 1996) (detailing how the
constitutional law was developed through principles of administrative law).
15. See Allen Zysblat, Protecting Fundamental Rights in Israel Without a Written
Constitution, in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 47, 49-50 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds.,
2009]
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of case law developed that balances basic rights with other rights and
interests.16 Human rights, no matter how important, are considered relative
rather than absolute, marking a difference from American jurisprudence.17
For instance, in the landmark decision establishing the right to equality as a
basic right in Israel, the Supreme Court emphasized: "[i]ndeed, general
goals [which every law is presumed to fulfill]-as the basic values they
derived from-contradict each other. More than once, these general goals
march in pairs of contradictions.. . . Once the Court faces them, it should
assign them the appropriate weight and balance them in the clash point.' ' 8
As a result of this relativist approach, Israeli courts define basic rights
broadly,' 9 since doing so does not forestall the ability to later constrict the
right when it comes into conflict with other rights and interests.2 °
There is no unitary constitutional document in Israel. However, Israeli
law does contain components of a written constitution, known as "Basic
Laws." Most of the Basic Laws deal with institutional aspects of the Israeli
legal system.2' In 1992, the Knesset passed the two Basic Laws that
constitute a partial Bill of Rights, the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation
and the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.22 The new enactment was
deemed "a constitutional revolution" by scholars.23 The new Basic Laws
each included a substantive limitation clause, which declared that protected
1996) (asserting that the court presumes that the "Knesset was cognizant of basic
individual rights when it shaped the legislative measure at issue").
16. See David Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A Mini-
Revolution in Israeli Constitutional Law? in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 141, 143 (Itzhak
Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996) [hereinafter Kretzmer, New Basic Laws] (explaining
that the Supreme Court has filled the void created by the lack of a Bill of Rights).
17. Cf id. at 150-51 (comparing the United States' model to other countries).
18. HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. The Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa City, 42(2) IsrSC 309, 335
(1988).
19. See, e.g., Mordechai Kremnitzer, Constitutionalization of Substantive Criminal
Law: A Realistic View, 33 ISR. L. REv. 720, 724-25 (1999) (discussing the implications
of absolutes in the law).
20. Cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (interpreting rights strictly, then creating specific
exceptions to their definition-a legal paradigm that differs from Israel's because the
American Constitutional amendments define rights in an absolute manner).
21. See generally Michal Tamir, Israel, in 2 LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 755,
757 (Herbert M. Kritzer ed., 2002) (discussing the structure and history of the Israeli
legal system).
22. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL, 154-56(Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996) (stating that the purpose of the Basic Laws
is "to protect human dignity and liberty").
23. See Ruth Gavison et al., Round Table: Israeli Constitutionalism, 6 YALE ISR. J.
25, 27 (2005) (describing the "constitutional revolution"); see also Ariel L. Bendor, Is
It a Duck?-On the Israeli Written Constitution, 6 YALE ISR. J. 53 (2005) (explaining
that the status of the Basics Laws rose to the top of the legal agenda only after the
enactment of the two human rights Basic Laws about which Chief Justice Aharon
Barak wrote extensively in his work titled "The Constitutional Revolution").
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rights can only be infringed, or trumped, by a statute that befits the values
of the state of Israel, pursues a worthy goal, and does not exceed the scope
necessary to meet that goal. 24 In sum, these laws are a demand of
proportionality.25 Given the central role basic rights have always played in
judicial decisions, the new laws constituted a revolution not in the sense of
defining protected rights, but rather in providing restrictions over
legislation. This revolution had the effect of sanctioning the Supreme
Court's willingness to review legislation inconsistent with the protected
rights.26 Thus, the new Basic Laws did not change the relative nature of
human rights, but rather clarified their normative superiority. In addition,
they strengthened the tendency to interpret legal norms in accordance with
the spirit of the basic norms.27
A. The Right to Equality
The purpose of this Section is to explore how the right to equality,
particularly as it relates to homosexual Israelis, has evolved over the past
few decades in Israel.
1. In General
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not explicitly guarantee a
right to equality. 8 This omission is not accidental but is a result of efforts
to overcome opposition from religiously motivated groups.29 Section one
of the Law does, however, state that "[f]undamental human rights in
24. See Asher Maoz, Constitutional Law, in THE LAW OF ISRAEL: GENERAL
SURVEYS 6, 9-10 (Itzhak Zamir & Sylviane Colombo eds., 1995) (comparing the
substantive limitation clause to the formal entrenched clause).
25. See Itzhak Zamir, Unreasonableness, Balance of Interests and Proportionality,
in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 327 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996) [hereinafter
Zamir, Unreasonableness].
26. See Baruch Bracha, Constitutional Upgrading of Human Rig hts in Israel: The
Impact on Administrative Law, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581, 590-91 (2001) (stretching the
application of Basic Laws, or public laws, to corporations); David Kretzmer, The
Supreme Court and Parliamentary Supremacy, in PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 303, 306-08
(Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds., 1996) [hereinafter Kretzmer, Supreme Court]
(detailing how the Courts have expanded rights given Israel's lack of a Bill of Rights).
27. See Zysblat, supra note 15, at 49-50 (explaining the rights-based approach).
28. See PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL, supra note 22, at 154-56.
29. See Kretzmer, New Basic Laws, supra note 16, at 148-49 (reasoning that the
jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce in Israel is granted to the religious
courts, and that since the law applied by both the Jewish Rabbinical and Muslim courts
may be regarded as discriminatory towards women, recognition of a constitutional right
to equality may affect the operation of these laws); see also Judith Karp, Chok Yesod
Kvod Haadam Vecheruto - Biografia Shel Maavakei Koach [Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty-A Biography of Power Struggles], 1 MISHPAT U-MIMSHAL [LAW
AND GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL] 323, 345-61 (1993) (providing a comprehensive survey
of the power struggles concerning the right to equality).
2009]
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Israel ... shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the
Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel., 30 This Declaration
established Israel as a Jewish, democratic state that grants "complete
equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of
religion, race or sex." 3' Thus, the Basic Law incorporates the notion of
equality.
Furthermore, since the theory of human dignity can be used to derive
other human rights,32 some justices of the Israeli Supreme Court have taken
the view that fundamental rights (such as equality) not expressly mentioned
in the Basic Laws are nonetheless protected under the umbrella of human
dignity as defined in the Basic Law.33 As Justice Eliyahu Mazza put it:
"with the enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the
normative status of the principle of equality-already (recognized) as 'the
heart and soul of our constitutional regime'. .. was raised and became a
constitutional principle of normative supremacy., 34 Other justices have
been reluctant to acknowledge that the Basic Law changed the normative
status of the right to equality. a Justice Dalia Domer has expressed a view
that the Basic Law only protects against infringements upon the right to
equality that reach the standard of degradation.36 Recently the Supreme
Court has adopted an intermediate approach under which the label of
"human dignity" covers all rights narrowly linked to human dignity.
37
According to this theory, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
30. PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL, supra note 22, at 154-56.
31. THE DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL (Isr.
1948), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%2
Othe%20Peace%20Process/Declaration%20of/o20Establishment%20of/o20State%20of
%20Israel.
32. See Haim H. Cohn, On the Meaning of Human Dignity, 13 ISRAEL. Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 226, 230 (1983).
33. See Kretzmer, New Basic Laws, supra note 16, at 149 (indicating that certain
justices have held that fundamental rights should be expanded); see also Alon Harel,
Gay Rights in Israel-A New Era?, 1 INT'L J. DISCRIMINATION & L. 261, 263 (1996)
[hereinafter Harel, Gay Rights] (asserting that the vague nature of Basic Laws gives
judges enormous power).
34. HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. The Minister of Def. IsrSC 49(4) 94 [1995]; see HCJ
5394/94 Hupert v. "Yad Vashem" [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 353, 363 (conveying the same
idea via Justice Theodore Or).
35. See, e.g., HCJ 453/94 Israel Women's Network v. Gov't of Isr. [1994] IsrSC
48(5) 501 (Zamir, J., concurring) (agreeing that the principle of equality received
powerful expression, but refraining from saying that it became a constitutional right
with super-normative status). This reluctance stems from the possible consequence,
not necessarily reflecting the intention of the Knesset, that a court can set aside a new
law inconsistent with the principle of equality. Id.
36. See HJC 4541/41 Miller v. Minister of Def. [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 45.
37. See HCJ 6427/02 The Movement for Quality Gov't in Isr. v. The Knesset
[2006] (Barak, C.J.) (indicating that while the intermediary approach does not extend
the Basic Law to cover every case of discrimination, it also does not limit the law to
only the most egregious scenarios).
THE HEBREW LANGUAGE
infringes upon the rights of self-fulfillment and liberty, is tied into the
concept of dignity, and was even perceived by the Israeli legislature as
humiliating.38 Hence, it seems to be protected by the Basic Law.
The extent to which the right is protected is, as noted above in the
distinction between coverage and protection,39 a separate question that
depends upon the balance that courts strike between the equality of gays
and lesbians and other competing interests and rights. The Basic Law
purports "to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to anchor... the
values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.' 40 The
substantive limitation clause declares that protected rights can be infringed
upon only "by a law fitting the values of the State of Israel." 41 Since these
values are defined as "Jewish and democratic," the equality of gays and
lesbians can also be qualified by employing an orthodox Jewish
interpretation to the concept of Jewish values.42
2. The Right to Equality of Individual Gays and Lesbians
Under traditional Jewish law, sex between two men is considered
unclean,43 while sexual intimacy between two women is not explicitly
addressed. The prohibition against male homosexuality is found in
Leviticus 18:22, which commands "[d]o not lie with a male as one lies with
a woman; it is an abhorrence," and Leviticus 20:13, which dictates that
"[i]fa man lies with a male as one lies with a woman, the two of them have
done an abhorrent thing; they shall be put to death-their bloodguilt is
upon them.",44 More recently, Zionist ideas have implicated gender and
sexuality in addition to nationalism; the new post-Diaspora Zionist man has
been characterized as hyper-masculine and distanced from the image of the
feminized gay man.45 Such religious and cultural attitudes are embodied in
38. See Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 1998 S.H. 166 (defining "sexual
harassment" as an, inter alia, "intimidating or humiliating reference directed towards a
person concerning that person's gender or sexuality, including that person's sexual
orientation").
39. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
40. PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL, supra note 22, at 154.
41. Id. at 155.
42. See Harel, Gay Rights, supra note 33, at 263 (empasizing the values of Israel as
a Jewish state).
43. See Aaron Belkin & Melissa Levitt, Homosexuality & the Israel Defense
Forces: Did Lifting the Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance?, 27 ARMED
FORCES & Soc'Y 541,556-57 (2001).
44. Leviticus 18:22, 20:13.
45. See Aeyal Gross, 21 ISR. STUD. F. 122, 122 (2006) (reviewing RAz YOSEF,
BEYOND FLESH: QUEER MASCULINITIES AND NATIONALISM IN ISRAELI CINEMA (2004),
and DANNY KAPLAN, BROTHERS AND OTHERS IN ARMS: THE MAKING OF LOVE AND
WAR IN ISRAELI COMBAT UNITS (2003)) (discussing the link between homosexuality
and masculinity).
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Israeli secular law, which, in the past, criminalized certain sexual
practices. 6 Both the Criminal Code Ordinance enacted under the British
Mandate and the Israeli Penal Code that replaced it prohibited sodomy
47
and both were interpreted as prohibiting both anal sex between two men
and between a man and a woman.48 Nevertheless, in 1972, the Attorney
General of Israel reissued instructions not to enforce laws against
consensual sexual acts of this type. 49 These directives were followed by
police and prosecutors.5 0  After several efforts to eliminate the section
prohibiting homosexual intercourse were defeated by strong pressure from
religious political parties, it was finally eliminated in 1988 as part of a
major sex crimes reform bill.5 1 This development was followed by many
other changes in criminal and civil law, such that "observers who examine
the legal changes in the status of gays and lesbians in Israel since 1988 are
astonished at the pace of the change. 52
In 1992, section two of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act, which
applies both to the public and private sectors, was amended to include
sexual orientation to the list of illegitimate grounds for discrimination
against employees and job seekers.53 In the years that followed, other
specific legal provisions were enacted or amended to incorporate the
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
54
46. See Yuval Yonay, Hadin Bidvar Netiya Chad Minit - Bein Historia
Vesochiologia [The Law Regarding Homosexuality-Between History and Sociology],
4 MISHPAT U-MIMSHAL [LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL] 531, 532-50 (1998)
(discussing the criminal prohibitions and the decriminalization process).
47. Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936 § 152(2) (Palestine Gazette, supp. No. 1, 285)
(prohibiting "carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature"); The Penal
Law, 1977 § 35, S.H. 226.
48. See Alon Harel, The Rise and Fall of the Israeli Gay Legal Revolution, 31
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 443, 449-53 (2000) [hereinafter Harel, Rise and Fall]
(surveying the laws and their interpretations).
49. Hanchayot Hayoetz Hamishpati Lamemshala (Guidelines of the Attorney
General), 50.049 (1.1.1972) [1972].
50. See Shimon Shetreet, Custom in Public Law, 21 ISR. L. REV. 450, 486 (1986)
(detailing a policy of non-enforcement regarding homosexual relations).
51. See Harel, Gay Rights, supra note 33, at 264 (reviewing the legal treatment of
gays and lesbians in Israel).
52. Harel, Rise and Fall, supra note 48, at 443.
53. Equal Employment Opportunities Act (Amendment), 5752-1992, (Isr.) S.H
1377.
54. See Prohibition on Defamation Act, (Amendment no. 5), 1997, S.H. 70
(prohibiting libel when it takes the form of humiliating a person because of her "gender
or sexual orientation"); The Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 1998, §3(a)(5),
S.H. 166; The Prohibition on Discrimination of Goods, Services and of the Entrance to
Entertainment and Public Places Act, 2000, §3(a), S.H. 58 (prohibiting whoever is
engaged in supplying public goods or services from discriminating against people on a
number of grounds, including sexual orientation); The Procurement Contract Act
(Amendment no. 16), 2003, S.H. 544 (adding a section which prohibits the public
authority holding a tender, from discriminating against an offeror, inter alia, on the
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In addition to the legal changes, there have also been important
developments in the attitude of the Israeli Defense Forces ("IDF") towards
homosexuals. 55 Most Israelis enter the military in their late teens, their
formative sexual years. The Israeli military has never officially banned
homosexuals from serving in its ranks. Nevertheless, before the 1980s, a
soldier's admission of homosexuality would likely have been met with
dismissal from the army. In 1983, the military adopted regulations that
officially approved the inclusion of sexual minorities, but implemented
some restrictions on their placement.56 In an effort said to protect the IDF
from being blackmailed, homosexual soldiers were prohibited from serving
in security or encryption positions.57 All known gay and lesbian soldiers
were also subjected to additional psychological testing to ensure their
fitness. In 1993, the regulations were changed and these particular
restrictions were officially lifted.58 Discrimination based only on sexual
orientation was prohibited and official policy subjected homosexuals to no
more scrutiny than all other candidates.59 In 1993, amendments were
drafted to the 1983 order abolishing any special criteria for homosexuals in
the military.6°
While Israeli law has moved in the direction of rights for homosexual
Israelis, there are a number of ways one could read the developments.
Alon Harel distinguishes between the concept of detached toleration
toward homosexuals, the argument that legal reforms protecting gays and
basis of sexual orientation); The Patient Rights Act (Amendment no. 2), 2004, S.H. 26(forbidding healthcare providers and medical institutions from discriminating against
patients on the basis of sexual orientation).
55. See Gross, supra note 45, at 124 (asserting that the army, and especially the
combat service, is one of the central homosocial institutions in Israeli society and that
such institutions rely on male bonding and often attempt to distance themselves from
homosexuality, and so are overtly homophobic).
56. See Belkin & Levitt, supra note 43, at 543 (stating that the new regulations
would not limit homosexuals in their service).
57. See ERIC HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A HUMAN RIGHT: AN ESSAY ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 280 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995). The
idea underlying this effort is that a homosexual, who has access to sensitive security
information, can easily be blackmailed by someone seeking this information, in return
for not disclosing his sexual orientation or the identity of the people with whom he had
been in a relationship. Id.
58. See Belkin & Levitt, supra note 43, at 542-43 (surveying the developments that
have taken place in the military: allowing homosexuals to serve in the military,
repealing security restrictions against sexual minorities, granting same-sex widower
benefits rights).
59. See id. at 543 (detailing the treatment of homosexuals in the Israeli military).
See generally DANNY KAPLAN, BROTHERS AND OTHERS IN ARMS: THE MAKING OF
LOVE AND WAR IN ISRAELI COMBAT UNITS (2003) (considering research based on
interviews with twenty-two homosexual soldiers who served in combat units in the
Israeli Army).
60. See Belkin & Levitt, supra note 43, at 544 (detailing the IDF's official
recognition of homosexuals' rights are to serve in the military the same as others).
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lesbians should be supported irrespective of one's moral beliefs, and the
idea of acceptance, the belief that reform should be supported on the
ground that homosexuality is a valuable way of life, or at least
incommensurable in its value compared to heterosexuality.61 Consider this
distinction in light of a 1997 Israeli Supreme Court case, in which the
Court invalidated a decision by the Minister of Education to prevent the
broadcasting of "Open (Exposed) Cards," a program that was devoted to
sexual orientation of teenagers. 62 The Court's decision was brief, poorly
reasoned, and based on grounds other than an equality doctrine.63 Justice
Kedmi refrained from expressing a positive approach towards gays and
lesbians in two ways: first, he emphasized that he did not want to "take a
stand regarding the 'phenomenon' of homosexuality, 64 and second, he did
not grant any positive rights, but merely noted that he found no justification
for limiting homosexual rights.65 Justice Kedmi found no reason to forbid
the broadcasting of the program, since he contended that watching it was
not damaging.66 Alternative positive reasoning would have acknowledged
the need to allow a minority group a platform for speaking and educating or
the need to allocate resources, such as money and airtime, in an equal
manner.67 "Harel argues that while Justice Kedmi's reasoning on its face
suggests detached toleration, a toleration which is compatible with
indifference, sympathy, or acceptance, the tone and vocabulary suggest
critical tolerance, a tolerance that evaluates homosexuality critically.
68
In a recently proposed constitution drafted by the Israel Democracy
Institute, the equality section does not explicitly contain protection against
61. See Harel, Rise and Fall, supra note 48, at 449 (describing how the advocates
of toleration and advocates of acceptance came together to transform the Israeli legal
system).
62. HCJ 273/97 The Soc'y for the Protection of Personal Rights v. Minister of
Educ. [1997] IsrSC 51(5) 822.
63. See Alon Harel, Batey Hamishpat Vehomosexualiyut-Cavod 0 Sovlanut? [The
Courts and Homosexuality-Dignity or Tolerance?], 4 MISHPAT U-MIMSHAL [LAW
AND GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL] 785 (1998) [hereinafter Harel, Dignity or Tolerance?]
(asserting that not only was the decision brief and non-dramatic, but that it lacked any
legal references or legal analysis).
64. The Soc 'y for the Protection of Personal Rights, HJC 273/97 at 825 (stating
that "[i]ndeed-without taking a stand in this matter-there are those who think that
this phenomenon is undesirable and even damaging. Yet, this does not justify ignoring
the existence of this phenomenon ... .
65. Id. at 826.
66. Id. at 827.
67. Tamir, supra note 5, at 113 (discussing the difference between positive and
negative protection of human rights and claiming that the Open Card case involved
negative protection, in that the court did not find a reason to prevent the right).
68. See Harel, Rise and Fall, supra note 48, at 466 (asserting that Justice Kedmi's
persistent use of the term "the phenomenon" in reference to homosexuality
demonstrates his discomfort with homosexuality).
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 69 This can be understood
as a compromise with the orthodox forces in Israeli society and as an
attempt to keep the status quo, another example of detached recognition
rather than acceptance.
B. The Right to Family
1. In General
The defining characteristic of family law in Israel is that, unlike in other
democratic countries and notwithstanding the otherwise liberal, secular,
Western Israeli legal system, it is governed by religious law.70  Civil
marriage does not exist in Israel.7' Marriage is perceived as the contractual
bond between "a man" and "a woman," and is recognized in this way in the
law.72 This legal recognition entails a series of in personam and in rem
rights and obligations.73 Some consequences of this regime might be
perceived as infringing upon the right to marriage expressed in
international treaties.
The family is considered an integral component of Israeli society.
Family Day in Israel is celebrated once a year, in February, in honor of the
69. ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE, CONSTITUTION BY CONSENSUS 117 (2001),
http://www.idi.org.it/sites/english/ResearchAndPrograms/ConsititionalLaw/Documents
/Hooka Excerpts.pdf.pdf (containing a section, "Equality under Law and the
Prohibition against Discrimination" in the current draft proposal of "Constitution by
Consensus" that states the following: "All are equal before the law; Persons shall not
be discriminated against on the basis of race, religion, nationality, gender, ethnicity,
country of origin, disabilities or any other reason.").
70. See Michal Tamir, A Guide to Legal Research in Israel, GLOBALEX, Aug. 2006,
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/israel.htm (noting that Israel follows the
Ottoman tradition, continued by the British Mandate, of according autonomy to the
various communities on matters of "personal status": personal, family, and inheritance
law). There are religious courts for the four main religious denominations: Jewish,
Moslem, Christian, and Druze. Each court tries cases on the basis of its respective
religious law, applying the particular religious law to members of its own community
who are citizens of Israel. For example, Rabbinical Courts have exclusive jurisdiction
in matters connected with marriage and divorce of Jews, and concurrent jurisdiction in
other matters of personal status. Id.
71. Carmel Shalev, Chofesh Hahitkashrut Lenisuin Velechayim Meshutafim
[Freedom of Cohabitation and Alternatives to Marriage], in MAAMAD HAISHA
BACHEVRA UBAMISHPAT [WOMAN'S STATUS IN ISRAELI LAW AND SOCIETY] 459, 460
(Frances Raday et al. eds., 1995).
72. See, e.g., The Jurisprudence of the Rabbanic Tribunals Act (Marriage and
Divorce) [1953] S.H. 134 (stating in Article 3 that if a divorce claim between Jews is
issued to the rabbinic tribunal, by the woman or the man, the rabbinic tribunal has
unique jurisdiction to deal with any matter associated with the claim, including alimony
to the woman and child support),
73. See BENZION SCHERESCHEWSKY, DINEY MISHPACHA BEYISRAEL [FAMILY LAW
IN ISRAEL] 88- 231 (4th ed. 1992) (describing the marital duties and rights under Jewish
Law, and the role of marriage in secular law; these duties also affect family law, as
marriage has implications for the sharing of assets and parental rights, for example).
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"family" institution.74 On this day, children typically invite their parents to
participate in school activities in which the theme of "family" features
prominently, including watching plays about family ties, listening to songs
whose lyrics celebrate family relationships, and participating in parent-
child team tournaments.
The right to family is an independent right in Israel. The current
constitutional state of the right is nicely summarized in the recent Adalah
case, in which an extended tribunal of the Supreme Court determined that
the right to family is embodied in the concept of human dignity and is thus
protected by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.75 Adalah concerned
a temporary order of the Israeli Citizenship Law that restricted the
possibility of family unification of Palestinians and Arab-Israeli couples by
denying the Palestinians' spouses permits to stay in Israel. The law was
approved by a slight majority of the Court.76 The justices unanimously
held that the right to family is part of human dignity but disagreed as to
whether that right covers the duty of the state to allow people to exercise
the right in Israel. Justice Salim Joubran, who wrote a distinct decision
regarding the ultimate result, pointed out that shared and joint life is one of
the most substantive aspects of the right to family. 77 Construing the right to
family as an integral part of one's potential self-fulfillment served as
Justice Joubran's general rationale for including it under the umbrella of
human dignity. In his own words:
It seems that in our days, few are the choices by which one fulfills his
free will, such as his choice of the person with whom he will share his
life, with whom he will create his family, with whom he will raise his
children. In choosing a spouse, in getting married, a person expresses
his personality and fulfills one of the main aspects of his individual
autonomy. In creating a family, one shapes the way he lives and builds
his very own world. Thus, in protecting the right to family, the law
protects the basic freedom of the citizen to live his life as an autonomous
74. Rachel Talshir, Family Day for 'Normal' Families, HAARETZ, available at
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/952339.html (describing the Family Day
tradition as celebrated in Israeli kindergartens).
75. See HCJ 7052/03 Adalah - the Legal Ctr. for the Arab Minority Rights in Isr. v.
Minister of Interior [2006] (denying a petition to declare the temporary order of the
Citizenship Act unconstitutional and void, by majority opinion of Cheshin, Rivlin,
Levy, Grunis, Naor and Adiel; Barak, Beinisch, Procaccia, Joubran and Hayut
dissented).
76. See id. at 24-38 (Barak, C.J.) (observing that many aspects of family life derive
from the broad principle of human dignity); id. at 46-47 (Cheshin, J.) (asserting that the
rights to marriage and family, including the right of a minor to live with his/her parents
are one of the foundations of society and are derived from the concept of human
dignity).
77. Id. at 10 (Joubran, J.) (asserting that the right to co-habitation is not marginal,
and that it is at the core of family rights).
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person, who is free to make choices.
78
Though the majority ultimately decided to uphold the temporary order, this
case is significant for the unanimous decision regarding the right to family
as part of human dignity, as reflected above in Justice Joubran's words.
2. Gays' and Lesbians 'Family Rights
The right to create a new-type family has already been indirectly
recognized in different decisions. For example, in 1993 the Supreme Court
enabled a common-law wife to take the name of her life partner and that of
their common children, 79 and in doing so the Court acknowledged that
one's name is part of'one's freedom of expression as well as one's ability
to develop self-identity. 80 Implicitly, this decision acknowledged the right
to create different types of families as an expression of autonomous will.
In another decision, the Supreme Court recognized a single mother and her
children as a family unit warranting equal treatment under law.81 However,
different laws define "family" differently depending on context, as Israeli
law has yet to forge a more coherent definition.82
In 1994, two contradicting decisions were issued regarding the rights of
Adir Shteiner, the male life partner of the late Colonel Doron Meizel, who
attempted to claim the benefits normally granted to opposite-sex partners
(married or common-law spouses). 83 While the appeal committee under
the 1985 Permanent Service Act (Benefits) granted Shteiner the benefits,
the appeal committee under the 1950 Fallen Soldier's Family Act
78. Id. at 7.
79. HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. The Supervisor of the Population Registry in the Ministry
of Interior [1993] IsrSC47(1) 749.
80. See id. at 771 ("A person's name is part of her personality. It is her social "I." It
is the key by which she paces in the social paths. It is not only an identification code. It
is an expression of personality, feelings, duty, tradition, destination . . . . Indeed,
recognition of ones' ability to change her name is a recognition of her self autonomy.").
81. See HCJ 2458/01 "New Family" v. The Comm. for Approving Surrogacy
Agreements of Surrogate Motherhood, Ministry of Health [2002], IsrSC 57(1) 419(refusing to grant a remedy, since the Court was considering the new arrangement of
surrogate motherhood, which should have been considered by the legislature).
82. Yuval Merin, Hazchut Lechayey Mishpacha Velenisuin (Ezrachiyim) - Mishpat
Benleumi Vemekomi [The Right to Family Life and to (Civil) Marriage - Domestic and
International Law], in ZCHUYOT KALKALIYOT, CHEVRATIOT VETARBUTIT BEYISRAEL
[ECONoMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL] 663 (Yoram Rabin & Yuval
Shani eds., 2004).
83. See Fallen Soldier's Family Act (Recompenses and Rehabilitation), 1950, S.H.
162; Permanent Service Act (Benefits), 1985, S.H. 141 (defining "partner" in both laws
as "whoever was his wife at the time of his death, including whoever was his common-
law wife living with him at that time, or whoever was her husband at the time of her
death, including whoever was her common-law husband and lived with her at that
time").
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(Recompenses and Rehabilitation) denied his claim.8 4 Finally, after several
negotiations and lawsuits, Shteiner was recognized as a beneficiary under
both laws and was granted the right to be invited to official memorial
85
services. Notwithstanding the substantial legal reforms sexual minorities
achieved in the context of military service in the IDF, Belkin and Levitt
have observed that informal changes are occurring at a slower pace.8
6
A focal point regarding gay rights in Israel was the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Danielowitz case, mentioned previously. After
several appeals in lower courts, the Israeli Supreme Court found Israeli
national airline El Al's practice of granting free tickets to employees'
opposite-sex partners, but refusing to extend the same benefit to
employees' same-sex partners, to be illegal under the Equal Employment
Opportunities Act.87 Vice President Barak, the second highest Justice on
the Israeli Supreme Court, wrote the majority decision in which he
emphasized the importance of equality as a fundamental right in Israeli
law, entrenched in a number of normative structures. 88 However, despite
the constitutional pathos and the classification of discrimination against
homosexuals as a "grouping discrimination" like race, nationality, or
religion, Justice Barak based his decision on a provision of the Equal
Employment Opportunities Act that states that sexual orientation shall not
be relevant in employment, unless required by the nature of the job.8 9 The
rhetoric of Justice Barak's decision is that of toleration and not of
acceptance, as evidenced by his emphasis that nothing in his decision
implies that homosexuality is morally on a par with heterosexuality.
90
Justice Barak went on to compare the partnerships of opposite-sex and
same-sex couples and concluded that even if differences exist between
them, they are not relevant to the issue at stake in Danielowitz.91 This case
provides another example of Israel's progressive record when it comes to
84. See Tamir, supra note 5, at 107.
85. See Harel, Rise and Fall, supra note 48, at 444 (recounting the details of
Shteiner's recognition under both the Permanent Service Act (Benefits) and the Fallen
Soldier's Family (Pensions and Rehabilitation Act)).
86. See Belkin & Levitt, supra note 43, at 550 (discussing the reactions of
heterosexual servicemen to homosexuality).
87. HCJ 721/94 El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. v. Danielowitz [1994], IsrSC 48(5) 749,
IsrLR 478 (remedying the violation by conferring the same benefit to same-sex
cohabitants). See ISRAEL LAW REPORT 1992-1994, at 478-522 (Jonathan Davidson ed.,
2002), for an English translation.
88. El Al Israel Airlines Ltd., HJC 721/94 at 486-91 (explaining that the principle
of equality is part of justice and is anchored in the Declaration of Independence, in the
Israeli Common Law, and in many specific laws).
89. See id. at 491-94.
90. See id. at 464.
91. See id at 491; Tamir, supra note 5, at 107-08 (describing the reasoning of
Justice Barak's decision).
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doling out formal, legal rights, but highlights certain undercurrents in
Israeli society wherein individuals cannot fully fathom the existence of
same-sex couples in larger society.
It is not clear whether Justice Barak's decision would have been different
in the absence of specific legal provisions that prohibit anti-homosexual
discrimination.92 That is, it is unclear whether the principle of equality in
itself would have sufficed to justify the outcome in Danielowitz.93
Commentators have claimed that the ambiguity was "sufficiently open-
textured to allow conflicting results concerning the recognition of same-sex
couples in the Israeli Legal system.,
94
The concurring and dissenting justices, however, were clearer on their
views of whether the principle of equality justified the Court's decision.
Justice Dalia Domer agreed with the result reached by Justice Barak but at
the same time emphasized that, in addition to having roots in the Equal
Opportunities Act, the right to partner benefits also derived from the
general principle of equality.95 Her decision conveyed compassionate
empathy towards homosexuals and unambiguous acceptance of
homosexuality.96 At the other extreme, Justice Jacob Kedmi dissented,
92. Tamir, supra note 5, at 107 (explaining that since Justice Barak implemented
the legal ban on sexual orientation discrimination, it is not clear if he would have
reached the same conclusion if there had not been an explicit legal norm addressing the
matter).
93. See Harel, Gay Rights, supra note 33, at 266. It is important to note that Justice
Barak's opinion is no longer ambiguous, based on a later decision that dealt with
employment discrimination on grounds of age. In that case, Justice Barak cited Justice
Domer's words in Danielowitz, holding that the Equal Employment Opportunities Act
demonstrates the preexisting equality principle, rather than establishing a new
principle. See Diun Nosaf ("D.N.") [rehearing] 4191/97 Rekanat v. The Nat'l Labor
Court [2000] 54(5) IsrSC 330, 369.
94. Aeyal M. Gross, Challenges to Compulsory Heterosexuality: Recognition and
Non-recognition of Same-Sex Couples in Israeli Law, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS 391, 396 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenes eds., 2001)
[hereinafter Gross, Challenges].
95. El Al Israel Airlines Ltd., HCJ 721/94 at 514 (discussing the importance of
equality on the basis of race, religion, nationality, language, ethnic group, age and
sexual orientation).
96. See Harel, Dignity or Tolerance?, supra note 63, at 462-63 (explaining that
Justice Domer's empathy towards homosexuals is expressed through her sentimental
description of the persistent persecutions of homosexuals). In a previous article, Harel
criticized Justice Dorner for ruling that the rights of gays and lesbians should be
acknowledged only because of the more tolerant societal attitudes toward them. He
argues that this position necessarily means that the more discriminated against the
minority group is, the less likely it is to be protected by the principle of equality. Harel
also pointed out that there are conceptual difficulties in the theory: Justice Domer's
main analysis relies on the growing tolerance towards gays and lesbians, but what if
such a growing tolerance is accompanied by the belief that employers should be free to
run their businesses as they wish and to distribute benefits in accordance to the criteria
they choose? There are no criteria in Justice Dorner's decision to determine which of
the prevailing societal attitudes are more relevant. See Harel, Gay Rights, supra note
33, at 266-67; see also Gross, Challenges, supra note 94, at 397 (arguing that from the
perspective of gay rights, it is risky to make the legal recognition of gay couples
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asserting that the term "spouse" as used in the employment agreements
simply does not include same-sex partners.97 He concluded that a
homosexual couple does not fall within the conceptual understanding of the
word "couple," and so the denial of the ticket did not constitute
discrimination.98 Behind Justice Kedmi's etymological inquiry into the
meaning of "couple" lies a fundamental belief that only a potentially
reproductive unit is entitled to recognition. Nevertheless, as Harel argues,
"it is the desire and pleasure rather than capacity for procreation which
seem critical to contemporary understanding of the basic unit constituting
society." 99 As for the distinction between tolerance and acceptance, Justice
Kedmi adopted, in Harel's terms, "critical toleration."'00 Aeyal Gross
identified another feature of the dissenting opinion: "that of 'imitation' in
the context of characterizing the behavior of two people of the same-sex
who 'imitate' the behavior of a [heterosexual] couple."' 1 1 In his view,
"Kedmi's heterosexual couple should be understood in this light: it presents
itself, the 'authentic,' as the pure source.
1 0 2
More recent decisions have furthered the legal recognition of new-type
family rights. In 1997, a family court in Haifa issued a protective order to a
lesbian woman under the Prevention of Violence in the Family Act.10 3 The
order restrained the woman's partner from entering the apartment in which
the protected woman lived. The decision rested on the interpretation of the
word "spouse" in the Act as applying to same-sex partners and established,
for the first time, that domestic problems in same-sex families could be
addressed in family court.0
4
In a less progressive decision than it appears at first glance, the Supreme
Court ordered the Minister of the Interior to register the adoption of a child
by his mother's lesbian life-partner.'0 5 The applicants were two cohabiting
contingent on the social acceptance of homosexuality).
97. El Al Israel Airlines Ltd., HJC 721/94 at 499 (arguing that marriage is what
grants legal and social recognition and protection to a couple, not cohabitation).
98. See id. at 512 (referring to a same-sex couple as a "pair," which is not
deserving of the same level of protection).
99. Harel, Gay Rights, supra note 33, at 269.
100. Harel, Dignity or Tolerance?, supra note 63, at 462.
101. Gross, Challenges, supra note 94, at 398.
102. Id. at 399.
103. Family File (Hi) 32520/97, Roe v. Doe [1997].
104. But see Family File (Ramat-Gan) 1630/08 Roe v. Doe (2008) (holding that the
Prevention of Violence in the Family Act did not apply to same-sex couples,
demonstrating the unclear legal situation deriving from the Danielowitz decision);
Family File (TA) 14480/98 Roe v. Doe (contending that the Tel-Aviv Family Court
had no jurisdiction to hear a case of a gay couple, since there was no indication that the
category "reputed as a spouse" included same-sex partners).
105. HCJ 1779/99, Roe v. Minister of Interior [1999] IsrSC 54(2) 368.
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lesbians who had lived in California and subsequently moved to Israel.
One gave birth to a child by means of sperm donation and the other
adopted the child through an order issued by a court in California. The
majority opinion found in favor of the couple based on the fact that a
registration officer is not authorized to check the validity of registration, a
technical decision that has no bearing on the ability of same-sex couples to
adopt children. However, the minority judge was reluctant to accept the
registration, questioning its validity on the grounds that Israeli law
prohibits adoption by same-sex couples. 106
In November 2004, the Nazareth district court allowed an elderly gay
man to inherit an apartment registered under the name of his late cohabiting
life-partner.l0 7 When the man sought an inheritance order declaring him to
be his partner's legal successor, his appeal was denied by the family court
even though he and the deceased had shared their lives for forty years. The
majority decision of the district court, however, asserted that while the
marriage section of the Inheritance Act is not applicable in this situation,
there is no reason not to apply the cohabiting section, which is broad
enough to include any kind of non-married couple.'
08
The past years have seen three important decisions by Israeli courts
concerning family agreements, adoption, and registration of same-sex
marriage. The first was a high-profile family court case, which approved
an agreement between two homosexuals regarding the relationship between
the two men, the twins of one, and the mother of the twins. 109 In a broad
and well-reasoned decision, the Court concluded that the Family Court
Act' 1° must be interpreted in accordance with the spirit of the Basic Law.
According to Israeli law, family agreements are valid only when the court
gives a decision of validity. As such, same-sex couples' right to equality
includes an ability to have such agreements approved in court, just as
heterosexual couples can.
The second decision was made by the majority of an extended tribunal of
106. Id. at 381.
107. CA (Nz) 3245/03 Anonymous v. The Custodian Gen. [2004].
108. Id. at section 19 (Nisim Maman, J.) ("[T]here is no reason today not to
recognize the inheritance rights of same-sex couples as a required step in the current
legal situation.").
109. See CA (TA) 6960/03 Roe v. Israel [2004] (basing the decision to give legal
validation to the parties' agreement, to a large extent, on arguments elaborated in
Tamir, supra note 5). For example, the court agreed with the argument that the Basic
Law should not be used to discriminate against a group (Tamir at 116), that the court
should use a substantive rather than a formal approach to equality (Tamir at 123), and
that fulfillment of one's homosexual identity is part of human dignity (Tamir at 96-97,
101).
110. Family Court Act, 5755-1995, (Isr.) S.H. 393.
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the Israeli Supreme Court with respect to two cohabiting lesbians.' 11 The
women, Tal and Avital, had three children together using donated sperm.
They entered an agreement detailing their joint ownership of shared
property and their specific plans for childcare. Fearing the contract
inadequate to guarantee the children's interests, each wanted to adopt the
children of the other. 12 The Supreme Court remanded the case to the
family court with instructions to determine whether approving that request
served the children's best interests. In February 2006, the family court to
which the case was remanded approved the adoption.' 13  A dissenting
opinion by Justice Eliyahu Mazza argued that since the Adoption Act does
not refer to the possibility of adoption by same-sex couples, it cannot be
interpreted to cover such adoptions. 1
4
The third decision was again made by the majority of an extended
tribunal of the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice." 5 The
appellants, five homosexual couples married in Canada, appealed the
refusal of the Ministry of Interior to change their registration status from
"single" to "married." The majority based its decision to allow the
registration on precedent" 6 which stated that registration of marital status
carries only statistical importance and is unrelated to the validity of the
marriage."17 This approach ignores the complicated questions regarding the
legal status of gay couples legally married in other jurisdictions, and the
issues of social and ethical recognition that their marriages raise, leaving
111. CA 10280/01 Jarus-Hakak v. The Att'y Gen. [2005] IsrSC 59(5) 64.
112. See ALBA CONTE, 1 SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND LEGAL RIGHTS § 16.8 (Wiley
Law Publications, 1998) (demonstrating the inadequacy of contractual relationships in
providing the continuity and stability necessary for parenthood).
113. Adoption (TA) 48/97 Jarus-Hakak v. Att'y General [2006].
114. Jarus-Hakak, CA 10280/01 (Mazza, C.J. opinion, 21) ("[M]y opinion is that
the words 'special circumstances' . .. can not be interpreted as recognizing ... the
legal status of same sex couples .... [T]his interpretation is undesired .... [T]he
social attitude regarding same sex couples is still controversial.").
115. HCJ 3045/05 The Ass'n for Civil Rights in Isr. v. Chief Registrar of
Population, Ministry of Interior [2006] IsrSC.
116. HCJ 143/62 Foonk-Shlezinger v. Minister of the Interior [1963] IsrSC 17(1),
25.
117. Cf Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 196 (N.J. 2006) (separating out the benefits
and responsibilities of marriage from the name and status of marriage). In Lewis v.
Harris, "same-sex couples brought action against state officials with supervisory
responsibilities relating to local officials' issuance of marriage licenses, alleging [that]
local officials' refusal to issue marriage licenses to plaintiff same-sex couples violated
their state constitutional rights to privacy, due process, and equal protection." Id. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right
entitled to protection under the liberty guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution,
however, committed same-sex couples must be afforded the same rights and benefits
enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples. Id. at 207, 211. Hence, the New Jersey
legislature was required to either amend the marriage statutes or enact a statutory
structure affording same-sex couples the same rights and benefits enjoyed by married
opposite-sex couples. Id. at 221.
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those issues to the Knesset. l' 8  The dissenting view rejected the
registration, arguing that the mere act of registering gay couples as
"married" could be perceived as officially legitimating and condoning the
possibility of a gay family unit, an option recognized in only a few places
worldwide. Following this decision, a Knesset member initiated a bill to
change the Registration Act in a way that prohibits the registration of same-
sex marriages as long as there is no Israeli law approving those
marriages.' 19 A new committee of the Israeli Bar established to protect gay
rights objects to the bill and argues that its purpose is to discriminate
against a minority group.1 20  Finally, in another recent and important
administrative decision, the Ministry of Construction and Housing entitled
same-sex families to receive aid for accommodations and mortgages.
121
While recent decisions advance the legal rights of homosexual couples to
create families, these decisions stop short of recognition of new-type
families. The family court decision regarding the approval of the family
agreement between the gay fathers and the children's mother, for example,
does not provide precedent for approval of prenuptial agreements between
unitary couples (in contrast to a "family agreement"). 122 Prenuptial
agreements are the major vehicle in Israel for couples to arrange their
proprietary rights over their financial assets, and their validity requires
approval of the court. 123 On this point-whether same-sex couples can also
submit their prenuptial agreements for judicial approval-there are
contradictory decisions in the various family courts. 124 With respect to
118. Cf Marc R. Poirier, Piecemeal and Wholesale Approaches Towards Marriage
Equality in New Jersey: Is Lewis v. Harris a Dead End or Just a Detour?, 59 RUTGERS
L. REv. 291, 296 (2007) (claiming that a piecemeal approach was "necessary,
inevitable, and useful" for furthering the recognition of same-sex couples in New
Jersey, "even though it also set up the possibility of a detour away from legalizing
marriage for same-sex couples").
119. See A Bill to Amend the Registration Act (Registration of Marital Status),
2006, http://www.knesset.gov.il/privatelaw/data/l7/1762.rtf (aiming to introduce same-
sex marriage through a social-political process, under the belief that legislation
recognizing gay marriage would be perceived as revolutionary and harmful to large
segments of the population).
120. Halishka Mitnagedet Lehatzaat Hachok Lesor Rishum Nusuim Shel
Homosexualim Velesbiot [The Bar Objects to the Bill Forbidding the Registration of
Same-Sex Marriage], ORECH HAD1N [THE LAWYER] (Feb. 2007).
121. See Shachar Illan, Zugut Chad-Miniyim Yekablu Siyua Bemashkantaot [Same-
Sex Couples Would Receive Mortgage Aid], HAARETZ, Mar.. 13, 2007,
http://news.walla.co.il!?w-//1076121 (detailing the decision, which is not public).
122. See CA (TA) 6960/03 Roe v. Israel [2004].
123. The Proprietary Relationships between Couples Act (1973), S.H. 267 § 2 ("A
prenuptial agreement requires approval of family court or the religious court, which has
the jurisdiction on marriage and divorce issues of the couple. The same approval is
needed for an amendment of the agreement.").
124. See, e.g., Family Court 47720/06 (TA) [2006] (affirming a contract between
two co-habiting lesbians, including an agreement to mutual parenting as a prenuptial
agreement, but emphasizing the concept of equality as the basis of the decision, not any
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adoption, the Supreme Court emphasized that its decision concerning
mutual adoption stems from the pursuit of the best interest of the specific
children involved and not from a general recognition of the legal capacity
of same-sex couples to adopt children. Moreover, the decision bears no
normative or moral judgment regarding the status of unitary couples. 25
This distinction between co-parent adoption (one partner is biologically
related to the child) and stranger adoption (neither partner is relation) is not
unique to Israel. 126 However, in Israel, it reflects the Court's awareness of
the reservations that a considerable part of the Israeli public feels towards
same-sex families.12 7  Even the decision concerning the registration of
same-sex marriage is less groundbreaking than it may appear because it
grants registration based on marriage certificates, regardless of whether the
marriage is recognized in Israel, and so falls short of legally validating
homosexual marriages. Once again, one can detect a pattern of formalistic
legal advancement for same-couples and their families, but advancement
that lacks corresponding social recognition or understanding.
III. THE THEORY OF RECOGNITION AND NEW-TYPE FAMILY ACCEPTANCE
While impressive, recent advancements in Israeli law regarding the
rights of homosexuals do not follow any particular logic, nor do they show
uniformity. 128 Israel still lacks a mechanism by which same-sex couples
and the families they create can garner official recognition of their
relationships. Instead, the gap between legally sanctioned and recognized
family life and the family life created and experienced by so many Israelis
grows ever wider.1 29 While in reality diverse family units exist, the legal
system still defines family as the nuclear unit founded upon heterosexual
marriage. The absence of a clear definition of "family" and the implicit
exclusion of alternative families from the meanings covered by the term
elucidation of what constitutes a marriage).
125. CA 10280/01 Jarus-Hakak v. The Att'y Gen. [2005] IsrSC 59(5) 64 § 26(Barak, J.); id, at 26 § 17 (Cheshin, J.) (explaining the limitations of their decisions).
126. See William E. Adams, Jr., Whose Family is it Anyway? The Continuing
Struggle for Lesbians and Gay Men Seeking to Adopt Children, 30 NEw ENG. L. REv.
579, 621 (1996) (discussing the distinction several American courts draw between co-
parent and stranger-parent adoption, which precludes gays in some states from
adopting).
127. See, e.g., Shahar Ilan, Shas MK Blames Gays for Recent Earthquakes in the
Region, HAARETZ, Feb. 20, 2008 (reporting on Shlomo Benizri, a member of the
Knesset, who blamed earthquakes on sodomy and other "perversions like adoptions by
lesbian couples").
128. Gross, Challenges, supra note 94, at 392 (asserting that to the extent that legal
recognition of same-sex couples does exist in Israel, it has evolved in a peculiar way).
129. See Shalev, supra note 71, at 502 (asserting that the greater the gap between the
ideology of the law and the reality of life, the more life overrides the written law).
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"family" hurts individuals who live in such alternative families. 30 In short,
new-type families are not recognized by Israeli society.
A. The Theory of Recognition
Theorists of recognition challenge the liberal idea that an individual or a
group is able to develop its self-understanding in isolation from others.
They argue that the capacity to develop an interpretation of one's own
needs and identity stems from, and depends upon, recognition by others.
Conversely, misrecognition or non-recognition can yield real damage to
individuals when society reflects back to them a distorted image of
themselves.
Thus, the liberal ideal of autonomy is challenged by the Romantic notion
of authenticity.131  For example, Charles Taylor again explained
authenticity this way in The Malaise of Modernity:
This is the powerful moral idea that has come down to us. It accords
crucial moral importance to a kind of contact with myself, with my own
inner nature, which it sees as in danger of being lost, partly through the
pressures towards outward conformity, but also because in taking an
instrumental stance to myself, I may have lost the capacity to listen to
this inner voice. [Authenticity] then greatly increases the importance of
this self-contact by introducing the principal of originality: each of our
voices has something of its own to say. Not only should I fit my life to
the demands of external conformity; I can't even find the model to live
by outside myself I can find it only within.1
32
Taylor's theories have been summarized as postulating that authenticity is
legitimate self-understanding, distinct from autonomy, and unaccompanied
by the politics of equal dignity.1 33  His thesis suggests that while the
struggle for legal equality was central in the history of liberal societies, it
was, to a large extent, replaced by groups' claims for recognition of their
cultural differences.
34
Theorists have identified two opposing camps in progressive politics:
redistribution and recognition. 135 Proponents of redistribution draw on a
130. See Merin, supra note 82, at 723.
131. See Ruth Abby, Charles Taylor's Politics of Recognition: A Reply to Jonathan
Seglow, 47 POL. STUD. 710, 710-11 (1999) (describing the conflict between these
modem western approaches).
132. CHARLES TAYLOR, THE MALAISE OF MODERNITY: THE MASSEY LECTURE
SERIES 29 (House of Anansi Press 1992). See Taylor, supra note 11, at 30, which
further expounds on the notion of authenticity.
133. Jonathan Seglow, Universals and Particulars: The Case of Liberal Cultural
Nationalism, 46, POL. STUD. 963, 973 (1998) (arguing against the notion of cultural
authenticity).
134. Taylor, supra note 11, at 37-44.
135. See NANCY FRASER & AXEL HoNNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION 1-6
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long tradition of egalitarian, labor, and socialist organizing and seek a more
just allocation of goods. Proponents of recognition draw a new version of
a "difference-friendly" society and seek a world in which assimilation to
majority or dominant cultural norms is no longer the price for equal
respect. Accordingly, the latter group seeks recognition of the distinctive
perspectives of ethnic, racial, and sexual minorities, as well as recognition
of gender differences.
136
For the purpose of our analysis, Axel Honneth's theory concerning The
Struggle for Recognition'37 serves as a starting point. In his view, one's
sense of self is necessarily established through interaction with others, in a
process of mutual recognition. Such processes take place at three levels:
family, society, and state. The structure of relations of recognition is
described in Table 1.
(Joel Golb, James Ingram & Christiane Wilke trans., 2003).
136. See Nancy Fraser, Recognition Without Ethics, 18(2-3) THEORY, CULTURE &
SOCIETY Soc. 21, 21 (2001); see also Neere Chandhoke, The Logic of Recognition,
Seminar Web Edition: Multiculturalism, (Dec. 1999), http://www.india-
seminar.com/1999/484/484%20chandhoke.htm. Chandhoke uses the urgent condition
of the Dalit, an 'invisible' social class in India, to parse out the two discrete, but not
mutually exclusive, moral conflicts inherent in the notions of redistribution and
recognition:
One form of conflict takes the shape of struggles over material resources,
political gains, and against deprivation. We can deal with this by the
redistribution of material and political resources. The other kind of moral
conflict that has come to dominate the body politic is the struggle for
recognition. Extension of respect becomes absolutely essential, for when
perverse and demeaning stereotypes come to govern the way a particular
community is perceived - as 'invisible', 'inferior', 'polluting', or as
'threatening' - we have a potentially incendiary situation on our hands.
Id.
137. AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE MORAL GRAMMAR OF
SOCIAL CONFLICTS (Joel Anderson trans., 1995).
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Table 1: Honneth 's Structure of Relations of Recognition138
Mode of Emotional Cognitive Respect Social Esteem
Recognition Support
DIMENSION OF needs and moral traits and abilities
PERSONALITY emotions responsibility
FORMS OF primary legal community of





PRACTICAL TO basic self- self-respect self-esteem
SELF-RELATION confidence
FORM OF abuse and rape denial of rights, denigration, insult
DISRESPECT exclusion
THREATENED physical social integrity honor, dignity
COMPONENT OF integrity
PERSONALITY
Love and emotional support constitute the basis of recognition in the
family. Through reciprocal loving care, family members know themselves
to be united and interdependent. Recognition must possess the
characteristic of effective approval and encouragement, since certain needs
and emotions can only be validated by being directly satisfied or
reciprocated. This relationship of recognition is thus also necessarily tied
to the physical existence of concrete others who hold each other in high
esteem. 139 Moreover, the development of a person's sense of independence
critically relies on an understanding that the love he or she shares with his
or her family will continue even when that person is no longer under the
immediate care of his or her parents; without such confidence, one cannot
recognize his or her independence. 140 Thus, recognition is characterized by
a dual process in which the other is released and, at the same time,
emotionally tied to the loving subject. The affirmation of independence is
supported and guided by care.
141
138. Id. at 129.
139. See id. at 95-96; see also Axel Honneth, Recognition or Redistribution?
Changing Perspectives on the Moral Order of Society, 18 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC'Y
43, 48-49 (2001) (emphasizing that physical and emotional needs can only be validated
through recognition).
140. HONNET, supra note 137, at 107.
141. See Catherine Audard & Stephen Grosz, Recognition, THE BRITISH
PSYCHOANALYTICAL SOCIETY, 2000 http://www.psychoanalysis.org.uk/recognition2.
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In the social dimension, the mode of recognition is cognitive respect
provided by legal rights. Legal relations differ significantly from love.
However, both are spheres of interaction, which should be understood as
patterns of socialization. In law, only once we have taken the perspective
of the "generalized other," which teaches us to recognize other members of
the community as bearers of rights, can we also understand ourselves to be
legal persons, in the sense that we can be reasonably confident that certain
of our claims will be met. 1
42
In addition to affectionate care and legal recognition, individuals need a
form of social esteem, which allows them to relate positively to their
concrete traits and abilities. 43 In modem societies, social relations of
symmetrical esteem between individualized and autonomous subjects serve
as a prerequisite for solidarity. According to Honneth,
[i]n this sense, to esteem one another symmetrically means to view one
another in light of values that allow the abilities and traits of the other to
appear significant for shared praxis. Relationships of this sort can be
said to be cases of "solidarity," because they inspire not just passive
tolerance but felt concern for what is individual and particular about the
other person.144
"These three patterns of recognition: love, legal order and solidarity, appear
to provide the formal conditions for interaction, within which human
beings can be sure of their 'dignity' and 'integrity." "9
45
This epistemological conception of the moral order of society has been
criticized as not satisfying reasonable demands for material
redistribution.1 46 When judged alone, claims for recognition risk failing to
"fully capture... the meaning of equality."' 147  In this context, Nancy
Fraser suggests a comprehensive framework in which the conception of
justice is expanded so as "to encompass distribution and recognition as two
htm (last visited July 3, 2009) (discussing Hegel and Winnicott's views of the
processes involved in mother-infant mutual recognition and tracing the need for
recognition from infancy to adult life).
142. HONNETH, supra note 137, at 108; see also Honneth, supra note 139, at 49-50
(arguing that a form of disrespect occurs when persons are not granted rights and
responsibilities equal to that of a "full legal person within their own community").
143. See Honneth, supra note 139, at 49-50 (emphasizing that self-esteem comes
from "solidarisitic acceptance" as well as society's perception of one's "abilities and
way of life").
144. HONNETH, supra note 137, at 129.
145. Honneth, supra note 139, at 50.
146. Id. at 52 (discussing the criticism surrounding Honneth's theory).
147. See Gila Stopler, Contextualizing Multiculturalism: A Three Dimensional
Examination of Multicultural Claims, 1 L. & ETmcs HUM. RTs. 309, 310 (2007) (noting
the impact of multicultural theory and claims of recognition by minorities on the need
for equality on all levels, including economic equality).
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mutually irreducible dimensions.' 48 Furthermore, she contends that the
"identity model" of recognition is problematic, since "it emphasizes
psychic structure over social institutions and social interaction. ' 49 Hence,
her proposal is to treat recognition as a question of social status.
According to this model, "what requires recognition is not group-specific
identity but rather the status of group members as full partners in social
interaction."' 50  Moreover, other scholars have emphasized that when
examining matters through the prism of recognition, "multicultural claims
should be analyzed in the political, social, and economic context in which
they are made and should not be detached from or given precedence over
other dimensions of justice."151
B. Recognition of New-Type Families in Israel
Israel has clearly made a move from a formal concept of equality
towards a substantive one, which, in Justice Mishael Cheshin's words, is:
"nothing but one of the derivatives of justice and fairness."' 152 Formal
equality finds its expression in Aristotle's classical position that equals are
to be treated equally and unequals unequally.' 53 This "formula leaves it to
the proponents of both equality and inequality to prove empirically whether
the persons among whom justice is to be done have characteristics...
entitling them to similar or different treatment.' ' 154 When dealing with
groups that have been historically and structurally discriminated against,
this position is problematic because such evaluation is influenced to a large
extent by the very same sterotypes that the equalization purports to
abolish. 55 Therefore, the modem concept of human equality-substantive
equality-is socio-dynamic rather than static. "Socio-dynamic equality
designates the need for an ongoing process of social introspection as
regards existing inequality in the treatment of members of society.' 156
148. Fraser, supra note 136, at 38. But see Honneth, supra note 139, at 54
(concluding that the term "just distribution" is derived from "the degree of social
esteem enjoyed by social groups" in line with a normative order).
149. Fraser, supra note 136, at 24.
150. Id.
151. Stopler, supra note 147, at 310-11.
152. HCJ 7111/95 The Union of Local Auths. in Isr. v. The Knesset IsrSC 50(3) 485(1996).
153. See ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
1729, 2035 (Jonathan Barnes ed., Princeton University Press 1984) (providing
examples of artistic and athletic ability to argue that individuals who are different
should be treated differently by society).
154. See Julius Stone, Equal Protection and the Search for Justice, 22 ARIZ. L. REv.
1, 4 (1980) (arguing against the presumption that until similarities or differences are
proven, all persons are entitled to equal treatment).
155. See Tamir, supra note 5, at 123.
156. See Frances Raday, Socio-Dynamic Equality: The Contribution of the
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The modem concept of substantive equality can help individual gays and
lesbians in their pursuit of equality, as shown in the historical overview of
advancement above. But is this concept sufficient for providing
recognition for new types of families? Such families are by no means
equivalent to classic families, and even identifying the lines along which
they should be compared is challenging. In addition, the issue here is not
of historical discrimination, but rather of a more complicated case of a new
type social unit formed by members of a historically marginalized group.
Liberal concepts of equality, as our research shows, may not be sufficient
in this case.
1 17
Israel's attitude as a state and the attitude of some members of its society
toward gays, lesbians, and alternative families can be titled the neutral
difference approach, which perceives sexual orientation as something that
should not be used as a basis for discrimination.158 This approach is still a
far cry from positive difference, whereby gays and lesbians, along with the
families that they form, are regarded as upstanding members of society
who diversify and enrich their communities. 15 9
Harel argues, in light of the legal developments that have taken place in
Israel since the Danielowitz case, that the gay legal revolution was
facilitated by the political support for equal treatment of gays and lesbians
which did not presuppose sympathy toward homosexual practices. 60 Thus
Harel concludes that it was not a process of liberalization that was
primarily responsible for the legal change, but rather that the change
occurred despite the continuing conservative nature of Israeli society:
The preconditions that facilitated the success of the gay legal revolution
are the ones that also limited its social significance. The legal measures
protecting gays and lesbians were possible because providing political
support for them did not presuppose any deep transformation of the
conservative nature of the Israeli society, or the norms governing its
social mores.161
Adversarial Process, in CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
THE UNITED STATES 141, 142 (Shlomo Slonim ed., 1990).
157. Cf Gross, Challenges, supra note 94, at 414 (citing Michel Foucault, who saw
the battle for gay rights as "an episode that cannot be the final stage," and spoke of the
need for "establishing homosexual lifestyles as cultural forms").
158. See EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE
LAW 2 (1990) (detailing how this view is reflected in many early legal developments
protecting gay and lesbian rights in the United States such as the decriminalization of
private, same-sex activities).
159. See DONALD G. CASSWELL, LESBIAN, GAY MEN AND CANADIAN LAW 10
(1996).
160. Harel, Rise and Fall, supra note 48, at 446 (arguing that activists and
politicians purposefully made the equality arguments ambiguous in order to avoid a
debate about the social acceptance of homosexuality).
161. Id.
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How parents experience the gap between their family's authenticity and
their social/legal non-recognition can be found in their own descriptions of
their family status. For example, a recent seminar on gay and lesbian
parents featured Eido Bumshtein, a thirty-four year old gay man whose
partner fathered a child with a heterosexual woman. Eido and his partner
were present at the delivery of the child. The child currently shares his time
equally between his mother's and father's households, which makes Eido,
as the biological father's cohabiting partner, a significant figure in raising
the child. Eido stated: "The Hebrew language has not created a title for me
and I live at peace with it. I am present for the child just as his father
is . ... ,,162
Eido is an unusual man. Not all those similarly situated are "at peace"
with their unclear social status. Yael and Dana are cohabiting lesbians who
were married in a private ceremony and are together raising a sixteen
month old baby boy, born to one of them. On Family Day 2007 in Israel,
they said "[w]e are literally a family but the state does not recognize us
even as a couple. Lior is the son of both of us, but the state views only his
biological mother as having duties and rights towards him."
' 163
In sum, while liberal ideas of autonomy and equality are well-established
in Israel, concepts of recognition are highly underdeveloped. The
discourse of cultural politics-unlike that of social politics-is limited and
questions of recognition and authenticity are rarely raised. Given this, we
believe it crucial to confront recognition of new-type families.
We thus suggest, as our findings below also reveal, that lack of status
pervades Israeli culture, which manifests itself as: 1) an absence of social
acknowledgment, or gap between the authenticity in which new-type
families live, and the non-recognition with which they are met, and 2) a
conspicuous absence in the Hebrew language itself. 64
IV. SOCIOLINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE
Names are important. The way in which a person or concept is named
by society often provides a view into what society thinks about what it has
named. Our motivation for using a sociolinguistic prism to examine issues
162. Tzachi Cohen, Horim ze Lo Tamid Aba Veima (Parents Are Not Always
Mommy and Daddy), ZMANIM MODERNIEM (Modem Times), Aug. 3, 2005, at 1.
163. LA-ISHAH [TO A WOMAN], Feb. 18, 2007.
164. Cf Mae Kuykendall, Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage as a Story about
Language: Linguistic Failure and the Priority of a Living Language, 34 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 385, 386 (1999) ("Gay lives and same-sex marriage are now something
said. The Saying takes place in private and in public. Public efforts to deny same-sex
marriages are thus Unsayings that strive to cancel, erase and shut off private and public
realities encoded in language. An Unsaying of such magnitude and public nature has
systemic consequences that transcend particular harm to an identity.").
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concerning identity and status of alternative families rests on the well-
established claim that language and social identity are tigitly linked.165
Language use and change have been associated with particular societal
norms, practices, conventions, customs, perceptions, attitudes, and
expectations. That is, language is a sociocultural phenomenon, interacting
with broad identity categories such as ethnicity, age, and gender. In fact,
language is one of the most salient representations of private and public
identity, and, as a result, a natural vehicle for establishing a sense of
belonging.1 66  Identity relations are also observed across more locally
defined cultural positions (e.g., popularity at the workplace), and these
relations emerge in the course of discursive interaction. 167
Specifically, identity is a sociocultural accomplishment, constructed
primarily through linguistic practices and indexed across a variety of
linguistic systems. It is a confluence of relational dimensions expressed
between one's self and other, such as adequation ("sufficient" social
similarity) versus distinction (social differentiation); authentication (the
genuineness of identity) versus denaturalization (falsehood of identity);
and authorization (institutionalized or ideological power) versus
illegitimation (the dismissal of identities in institutionalized contexts). That
is, identity simultaneously emerges on inter-subjective and interactional
bases. Identity derives from co-constructed intentions, perceptions and
representations as well as more general ideological processes articulated in
discourse.
This view of identity links neatly with the aim of the present study to
shed light on the self-identity of alternative families in Israel by examining
their discourse regarding their family situation, since "even the most
predictable and non-innovative identities.., are only constituted as
socially real through discourse .... To date, research on language use
among gays and lesbians has typically focused on the link between
language and issues of gender, sexual identity, or desire1 69 with very little
165. See PETER TRUDGILL, SOCIOLINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 13-34 (1974)(discussing the interconnectivity of language and society, including the function of
linguistic behavior in "establishing relationships" and "conveying information about
the speaker").
166. See DAVID CRYSTAL, THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE 17-48(Cambridge University Press 1987) (discussing how language and identity are linked
and how this link is manifested in different social groups).
167. See Mary Bucholtz & Kira Hall, Identity and Interaction: A Sociocultural
Linguistic Approach 7 DISCOURSE STUD. 585, 585 (2005) (examining linguistic
interactions in order to develop a framework for an analysis of identity).
168. ld. at 591.
169. See Mary Bucholtz & Kira Hall, Theorizing Identity in Language and Sexuality
Research, 33 LANGUAGE SOC'Y 469, 469 (2004) (emphasizing the intersubjective
nature of sexuality and identity, specifically focusing on a "desire-centered view of
sexuality" in research on identity).
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attention to notions such as family or parenting. Israel provides an ideal
environment for such a study because, as we discussed above, Israeli law
approaches formal equality, but may or may not approach substantive
equality.
While limited, there has been some sociolinguistic study of gay and
lesbian use of terms to define family and parenting, primarily found in the
works of Celia Kitzinger and Victoria Clarke, who analyzed discussions on
gay/lesbian parenting in English-speaking cultures. 70  In the following
sections, we summarize Kitzinger and Clarke's work and provide a brief
overview of the background against which the sociolinguistic study of
gay/lesbian language has emerged.
A. Language and Gender
Much of the early work examining the relationship between language
and gender has focused on differences between men's and women's
speech. Such differences, termed linguistic sex differentiation or
sociolinguistic gender patterns, are often attributed to the distinct social
roles of men and women in society. 171 Informed by feminist theory, many
language and gender studies focused on issues of social equality,'
72
identifying patterns of sexism in language structure, meaning, and use.
173
Such studies typically associated women's language with powerlessness,
insecurity, dependency, and subservience, which have been interpreted
170. See, e.g., Victoria Clarke et al., "Kids are Just Cruel Anyway": Lesbian and
Gay Parents Talk about Homophobic Bullying, 43 BRIT. J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 531, 531(2004) (evaluating the psychological and social effects of homophobic bullying on
children from gay and lesbian households); Victoria Clarke, "We're All Very Liberal in
Our Views": Students' Views: Students Talk about Lesbian and Gay Parenting, 6
LESBIAN & GAY PSYCHOL. REV. 2, 2 (2005) [hereinafter Clarke, We're All Very
Liberal] (analyzing a student focus group to identify levels of tolerance regarding gay
and lesbian parenting); Victoria Clarke & Celia Kitzinger, Lesbian and Gay Parents on
Talk Shows: Resistance or Collusion in Heterosexism?, 1 QUALITATIVE RES. PSYCHOL.
195, 195 (2004) [hereinafter Clarke & Kitzinger, Talk Shows] (illustrating that
heterosexist framing of debates on talk shows forces gay and lesbian guests to make
apologetic or defensive arguments); Victoria Clarke & Celia Kitzinger, "We're not
Living on Planet Lesbian ": Constructions of Male Role Models in Debates about
Lesbian Families, 8 SEXUALITIES 137, 137 (2005) [hereinafter, Clarke & Kitzinger,
Planet Lesbian] (analyzing the response of gay and lesbian parents to the claim that
children, especially boys, suffer from being raised in lesbian households due to a lack
of male role models).
171. See RALPH FASOLD, SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF LANGUAGE 89-118 (Wiley-
Blackwell, 7th ed. 1990) (discussing basic notions in the study of the relationship
between sex and language); TRUDGILL, supra note 165, at 84-102 (discussing the
differences between male and female speech).
172. See ANNE PAUWELS, WOMEN CHANGING LANGUAGE 16-80 (Addison Wesley
Longman 1998) (identifying trends in international language planning and highlighting
women's efforts to change biased representations of sexes in language).
173. See Deborah Cameron, Introduction to Part II, in THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF
LANGUAGE: A READER 83, 83-90 (Deborah Cameron ed., Routledge 1998) (reviewing
studies on sexism in language).
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from a variety of perspectives. For example, Dale Spender claims that
sexism in language stems from men's patriarchal power, used to determine
semantic meaning in language, and, as a result, perpetuate women's social
inferiority. 174  Others attribute sexist practices to contextual factors,
governed by the view that men are generic human beings and women are
gender-defined, or that only the male gender is recognized by language and
culture. 1
75
Language defined in terms of gender differentiation has been termed
gender-appropriate language. 176  This notion is based, in part, on the
popular belief that heterosexuality is a natural default whereby opposites
with complementary social roles attract. This belief is anchored in
compulsory heterosexuality, a political institution whose primary goal is to
preserve the gender hierarchy existing between men and women, whereby
women are subordinate to men. 177 Such a view deems language use by
individuals whose identities are non-heterosexual as gender inappropriate.
However, direct linguistic indexing of gender is rarely observed.
78
Language practices do not presuppose the identity of a speaker-writer as
male, female or other, but rather interact with a constellation of factors
such as personality, social stance, and social activity, with particular
pragmatic functions.1
79
B. Language and Homosexuality
Over the years, the study of language used by individuals with
174. See DALE SPENDER, MAN MADE LANGUAGE 1 (Routledge 1980) (asserting that
male societal power has allowed men to "construct the myth of male superiority and
have it accepted"). See generally Robin Lakoff, Language and Women's Place, 2
LANGUAGE Soc'Y 45 (1973) (arguing that female identity is lost in language).
175. See generally Maria Black & Rosalind Coward, Linguistic, Social and Sexual
Relations: A Review of Dale Spender's Man Made Language, in THE FEMINIST
CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE: A READER 100 (Deborah Cameron ed., Routledge 1998)
(analyzing the notion of 'man made language' and the distinction between discourse
required to develop feminist theory and the system of language); Luce Irigaray,
Linguistic Sexes and Genders, in THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE: A READER
119 (Alison Martin, trans., Deborah Cameron ed., Routledge 1998) (exploring further
the ways in which gendered language affects society).
176. See DEBORAH CAMERON & DON KULICK, LANGUAGE AND SEXUALITY 50-51
(Cambridge University Press 2003) (presuming that gender-appropriate speech is
equivalent to heterosexual speech while gender-inappropriate speech is equivalent to
non-heterosexual speech).
177. Id. at 44.
178. See Elinor Ochs, Indexing Gender, in RETHINKING CONTEXT: LANGUAGE AS AN
INTERACTIVE PHENOMENON 335, 340 (Alessandro Duarti & Charles Goodwin eds.,
1992) (examining the cultural significance of the categorization of men and women in
language). Indexing refers to a direct mapping of linguistic form with social meaning,
which Ochs argues does not capture the relation between language and gender. Id.




homosexual and lesbian identities has evolved. 180 Early studies perceived
homosexuality as an aberration identifiable through the use of homo-
specific code containing a special inventory of lexical items-a "lavender"
lexicon' 81-and a tendency to show grammatical gender inversion. Such
studies were grounded in the heteronormative idea that gay men are
womanly and thus are attracted to men, and that lesbian women are manly
and therefore desire women. Interestingly, no linguistic characteristics
were associated with lesbian women, since lesbianism was regarded as "a
phase, a pose, a strategy to become thespian, or an expression of petulant,
confused dissatisfaction with men."'
' 82
Many homosexuals and lesbians tried to reject the peculiar linguistic
patterns associated with gay language on sociopolitical grounds, since such
patterns at times thwarted their attempt to gain mainstream acceptance. In
the 1980s, gayness and lesbianism were increasingly treated as a
phenomenon involving oppressed minorities where "gayspeak" was
thought of as stemming from clearly defined social identities. The main
endeavor in this line of research was to find commonalities that cut across
varieties of gay/lesbian identities, on the assumption that there exist gay
and lesbian communities with distinct linguistic practices. These include,
in addition to a unique lexicon and use of gender inversion, certain patterns
of voice quality, 183 also known as "the voice," and "feminine" collaborative
discourse patterns. 84 Studies identifying these patterns have come under
attack, since it is difficult to identify language patterns that are gay-
exclusive, even if statistically such patterns are more prevalent among gay
individuals. 185
Moreover, in the 1990s, diversity among non-heterosexuals started
occupying an increasingly important role in the political agenda of
gay/lesbian activists. As a result, sociolinguistic inquiry broadened to
180. See id. at 74-106 (discussing the history of the debate surrounding whether gay
men and lesbians have a distinctive language).
181. See id. at 78 (analyzing homosexuals' "' secret language' of identity"); JOAN
SWANN, A DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLINGUISTICS (Edinburgh University Press 2004)
(characterizing "gay language" as lavender, a color associated with the gay and lesbian
community for many years).
182. CAMERON & KULICK, supra note 176, at 86.
183. See Arnold Zwicky, Two Lavender Issues for Linguists, in QUEERLY PHRASED:
LANGUAGE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY 21, 22-23, 26 (Anna Livia & Kira Hall eds.,
1997) (elaborating on the lexical items used to refer to homosexuality).
184. See JAMES W. CHESEBRO, DOES A GENERAL THEORY OF
HOMOSEXUALITY/GAY/QUEER COMMUNICATION EXIST?, 28-29 (Apr. 6, 2002),
available at jwchesebro.iweb.bsu.edu/Research/Homosexuality.doc (noting the
existence of verbal and non-verbal symbols in the gay and lesbian community).
185. See CAMERON & KULICK, supra note 176, at 59, 81-82 (detailing an early study
of male, homosexual speech in which the subjects often used the feminine pronouns
and titles, "she," "her," "miss," "mother" and "girl" when referring to males).
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include examinations of language use among drag queens, bisexuals,
transvestites, and others. The resultant body of work is known as queer
linguistics.186 Many studies within this framework consider sexual
identities as discourse accomplishments, in which a variety of linguistic
resources are combined to create a certain social positioning. In the present
study, we are concerned with the sociocultural positioning of the spectrum
of individuals involved in alternative parenting, including gays and lesbians
and their children, as well as single heterosexual women who decided to
mother a child with a gay man, so providing an additional perspective to
the way households with gay fathers operate. We are particularly
interested in examining the language used by such individuals when
describing their family constellations to others in order to shed light on the
newly evolving identity of alternative families.
C. Language and Gay/Lesbian Parenting
The connection between language and alternative parenting is clearly an
understudied topic. The few studies that do exist have focused on English-
speaking cultures, examining talk about controversial issues, such as the
right of gays and lesbians to parent children 8 7 and the need or lack thereof
for a male role model in lesbian households,' 88 children growing up in
same-sex families as victims of homophobic bullying, 89 and general
debates supporting or opposing gay/lesbian parents. 90  For example,
Clarke and Kitzinger analyzed conversations on British and American talk
shows hosting gay/lesbian parents and suggested that such parents typically
adjust their linguistic choices to fit heterosexual framing and adopt an
apologetic tone when discussing their family situations.' 9' Such framing is
accomplished through host questions that call into question gays' and
lesbians' right to create families or by the host's oppositional positioning of
186. See generally, QUEERLY PHRASED: LANGUAGE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY 3
(Anna Livia & Kira Hall eds., Oxford University Press 1997) (containing a compilation
of essays on the topic).
187. See, e.g., Victoria Clarke, What About the Children? Arguments Against
Lesbian and Gay Parenting, 24 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 555, 555-70 (2001)
[hereinafter Clarke, What About the Children?] (discussing various arguments against
gay parenting).
188. See Clarke & Kitzinger, Planet Lesbian, supra note 170, at 137-39 (exploring
the necessity of male role models).
189. See Victoria Clarke et al., supra note 170, at 532-33 (identifying children's
challenges with bullying when they are victims because of their different family
dynamic).
190. See Clarke, We're all Very Liberal, supra note 170, at 2 (discussing general
views of gay/lesbian parenting).
191. Clarke & Kitzinger, Talk Shows, supra note 170, at 212 (describing this as a
tactic used by participants to minimize the 'disability' of homosexuality that impairs
the ability of lesbians and gay men to integrate into heteronormative structures).
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herself as a representative of heterosexual viewers against a homosexual
guest. In such a context, an open-minded host is one that allows the
"controversial" parent to defend him/herself.
Clarke and Kitzinger identified six thematic categories that arise in
discourse sympathetic to gay/lesbian parents, which reflect an overall
tendency for "normalization," such as an attempt to incorporate gay/lesbian
families into mainstream practices.192 They contend that these categories,
both based on the semantic content and the ideological function of gay
parents' statements, inform our understanding as to the sociocultural
meanings of gayness and lesbianism.
The first category is "I'm not a lesbian/gay parent."' 93  In placing
themselves in this category, gay/lesbian parents reject the juxtaposition of
the terms gay/lesbian and parent, on the assumption that parenting is the
same socially, whether gay/lesbian or straight. Second is the category
"we're just the family next door."' 94 In this instance, gay/lesbian parents
amplify their ordinariness by describing their daily routine as resembling
just what is observed in an average heterosexual household. Third comes
"love makes a family,"' 95 where love in a home with same-sex parents is
acceptable as a last resort: a loving gay/lesbian relationship is positioned as
preferable to a loveless and dysfunctional heterosexual family. Fourth is
"God made Adam and Steve," 196 which aims at fitting gays and lesbians
into a religious (Christian) ideology. Next is the category "children as
'proof,', 197 where heterosexuality or conventional gender identities of
children growing up in gay/lesbian families provide evidence to refute the
supposed detrimental effects of being raised by same-sex parents on the
child's healthy psychosexual development, such as giving rise to a next
generation of gays/lesbians. Last is the category of "the benefits of
growing up in a lesbian/gay family."'198 This category stresses the fact that
children raised in gay/lesbian families are always planned; consequently,
they always experience love and the feeling of being wanted. It also
emphasizes that the non-normative identities of such parents exposes their
children to diversity, tolerance, and pluralism very early in life.
The semantics in the discourse of gay/lesbian parents point to "bland and
apolitical language, avoiding any discussion of overtly political concepts
192. See id. at 202 (noting different themes used by talk shows to normalize lesbian
and gay parenting, serving to fit these families into the larger vision of society).
193. Id. at 202-03.
194. Id. at 203-05.
195. Id. at 205-06.
196. Id. at 206-07.
197. Id. at 207-10.
198. Id. at 210-11.
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such as power and oppression, and of feminist and lesbian/gay values.
They are also careful not to claim that their parenting is "different from, or
better than, conventional parenting."1 99 Clarke and Kitzinger interpret such
linguistic practices as implicit consent to heterosexism, which, they argue,
is promoted by the various talk shows where gay and lesbian parents are
not really afforded an opportunity to speak of their experience as parents
but rather are expected to explain how they aspire to fit into mainstream,
heterosexual structures such as marriage or the nuclear family. The
different categories are summarized in Table 2.




"I'm not a lesbian/gay parent" Rejection of the notion 'gay/lesbian
Sparenting'
"We're just the family next Resemblance to ordinary households
door"
"Love makes a family" Last resort love
"God made Adam and Steve" Consistency with Christianity
"Children as 'proof " Children may end up gay/lesbian
"The benefits of growing up in Children are planned, loved, and
a lesbian/gay family" exposed to diversity & pluralism
The configuration of new-type families is not "equal" to that of
traditional families, and legal principles, such as "equality" or even
"substantive equality," are insufficient for handling the complexities in the
emerging identity of alternative families. We focus, therefore, on the
variety of linguistic devices parents in alternative families employ to
describe their families in an attempt to identify personal, social, and legal
gaps they expose. The question we address is how the legal system should
address these gaps. Why such a discussion is necessary has been stated by
Mae Kuykendall, who examined language used to describe gay marriage in
the United States:
The explosion of gay speech, answered with a legal Unsaying in the
marriage context, requires the overt use of linguistic manipulation and
forms of artifice that inflict gratuitous harm on individual gay people and
that harness public policy to attack the self-confidence of the citizenry at
large in their project of collective definition through common making of
199. Id. at 211.
200. Id. at 202-211.
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meaning in daily speech. Marital codes that seek to freeze public
meanings about intimate associations are at odds with the
experimentation and robustness, indeed the orneriness, of American
speech.
20 1
Our objective is thus to examine the self-identity of gay and lesbian
individuals in the context of their nontraditional family constellations and
explore how their identity formation and articulation intersect with
language, legal regime, and Israel's current sociocultural climate.
V. METHODOLOGY
The study carried out here is qualitative and is based on data collected
from twelve participants, who were each interviewed concerning their
specific family set-up. A description of the participants, method of data
elicitation and transcription, and the categories of linguistic analysis
performed, are provided below.
A. Participants
Data were collected from twelve parents living in alternative families.
Our study consisted of a wide variety of new-type families. One couple
(each partner interviewed separately) consisted of cohabiting lesbian
women, raising twin girls, who at the time of the interview were eight-and-
a-half years old. Two separate female participants were heterosexual
women who each decided to mother a child with gay men cohabiting with
their partners. Another was the gay partner of a biological father (who was
himself a subject) to a six-month-old baby boy; the baby's mother is a
lesbian woman cohabiting with her life partner who has a child of her own,
fathered by a different gay man living with his own life partner. Another
was a gay man who fathered twin girls with a heterosexual woman; the
mother was also an interviewee. A full list of our subjects can be found in
Table 3.
201. Kuykendall, supra note 164, at 391.
2009]
JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 17:3
Table 3: Subjects
Participant Family Status Children + Age (at time
of interview)
RI Non-biological Twin girls (8.5 years)
lesbian mother
E Biological lesbian mother Twin girls (8.5 years)
Si Biological Boy (8.5 years)
heterosexual single mother
(with gay father)
S2 Biological Two girls (2 and 5
heterosexual single mother years)
(with gay father)
J Gay partner of a biological Boy (6 months)
gay father
0 Biological gay father (with Boy (6 months)
lesbian mother)
K Biological lesbian mother Girl (3 years); partner
pregnant
A Biological gay father Twin girls (2 years)
R2 Biological Twin girls
heterosexual mother (3.5 years)
(with gay father)
G Biological gay father Boy (1.5 years)
(with heterosexual mother)
S3 Biological gay father Girl (3.5 years)
(with heterosexual mother)
P A lesbian woman married to Intends to have children
another woman
Subject recruitment for the study was difficult. Potential participants
were told they would be interviewed for a study of alternative families, and
that they would be kept anonymous. Some declined to take part in such a
study out of fear of exposure and a desire to protect their children. Such
reluctance is, perhaps, an additional indication of the difficulties that
parents leading a non-standard family-life experience. Due to the difficulty
of getting subjects, we decided to carry out a qualitative rather than a
quantitative study that provides an in-depth analysis of the speech of
individuals willing to discuss their unique family situations openly.
Each subject participated in an approximately hour-long, semi-structured
584
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interview, 202 based on a questionnaire we designed in advance and adjusted
to fit each interviewee's specific experience. The interviewees were given
the option to focus on a period of their choice, such as pregnancy, birth,
after birth, or parenthood, in their response to each question. The
questionnaire consisted of fifteen main questions designed to elicit
responses concerning different aspects in the formation of self-identity of
alternative families. These included four broad categories of questions
which we title general, pre-family-forming, family-internal, and family-
external questions. Table 4 lists the questions included in each of the
categories.
202. See New-Type Family Interviews (on file with authors). As promised to
protect the confidentiality of the interviewees, the dates of the interviews and their
locations have been withheld. The interviews were audio taped and transcribed. The
transcripts were not transformed into phonemic or phonetic transcription, since the
authors' primary focus in this study is on the thematic content expressed. Thus,
information specific to the spoken modality, such as pausing or other prosodic features,
was ignored. Four of the interviewees refused to be recorded, and therefore minutes of
their interviews were taken by the interviewer. All subsequent footnotes quoting
speech from the interviews should be understood as deriving from the transcriptions
and/or minutes on file with the authors of this article. The content of such footnotes has
been verified by the Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law.
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Table 4: Example Survey Questions
Category Questions
General o How would you define your family status?
o If you had to describe the gap between the real vs. the
desired state of affairs, how would you characterize it?
o What were your considerations in choosing where to
live?
o Are you getting any professional counseling? If so,
for what purpose?
Pre-family- o What was your motivation for creating a family?
forming o Have you done anything to establish your couplehood
legally?
o What were your considerations in choosing the
specific means for having the child (e.g., sperm
donation, gay/heterosexual partner, etc.)?
o Did the decision to have a child precede or follow
your coming out of the closet?
o Did you feel that you belonged to a specific
community before having a child?
o Do you feel that in forming a family
you have performed some sort of feminist act?
Family-internal o What kinds of specific difficulties do you experience
within the family?
o Do you see your family unit as lacking or whole?
o What is the division of labor and roles within your
family?
o Is being the biological parent of your child significant
in any way?
o How would you describe your relationship with your
child? Has your being a special kind of family affected
your relationship?
Family-external o What kinds of social difficulties have you come
across (e.g., with caregivers, teachers, extended
family)? Have you faced any particular types of
responses or different terminology?
o Have you encountered any kind of institutional
difficulties (e.g., with Social Security, social benefits,
healthcare systems, schools)?
o Are there special financial problems that are
particular to your family situation?
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B. Categories ofLinguistic Analysis
Our sociolinguistic analysis of the dataset is thematic in nature. The
analysis relies on direct and indirect linguistic indices used for
sociocultural positioning in discourse.0 3 Direct indices consist of explicit
mention of social category labels, including noun phrases such as "stay-at-
home mom," and possible qualifiers, such as adverbial phrases, adjectival
phrases, and clausal complementation, for example, "the marriage thing is
not an important thing for me personally." Additional indices include the
juxtaposition of labels with other social categories, e.g., the mention of
"alternative family" and "same-sex parents" in a single discourse tuM.2 4
Indirect indices refer to implicit pragmatic processes that require inferential
work on the part of discourse participants, such as presupposition and
implicature. °5  Presupposition is the common, unchallenged, non-
controversial ground shared by the speakers in a given discourse context-
for example, the idea that gay/lesbian parenting is fraught with difficulties
associated with the sexual identities of the parents. This presupposition
framed the interview so as to allow for open discussion of the complexities
that arise in the different family situations discussed.
Implicature concerns meanings that speakers express beyond the literal
meaning of the words they use. For example, the term "partner in
parenting"20 6 was used by a gay father to describe the particular
relationship between him and the heterosexual woman with whom he
fathered his twin daughters. This terminology implies a contractual nature
to the relationship that is not generally apparent in discussions of
heteronormative parenting, emphasizing the father's active involvement in
the upbringing of the children.
A related indirect linguistic index is evaluation as a reflection of
discourse stance. John DuBois describes such evaluation as a tripartite
discursive process of object evaluation, self positioning, and alignment
with other(s), in which stances feed on one another in interaction by
203. See Bucholtz & Hall, supra note 167, at 585 (outlining sociolinguistic indices
and approaches).
204. See Harvey Sacks et al., A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of Turn-
Taking for Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF CONVERSATIONAL
INTERACTION 7, 27-28 (Jim Schenkein ed., Academic Press 1978) (identifying a "mtum"
as a basic conversational unit used by a discourse participant in order to perform a
social action in a given discourse context, e.g., asking a question).
205. See GILLIAN BROWN & GEORGE YULE, DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 28-33
(Cambridge University Press 1983) (presenting examples and information on
presupposition and implicature).
206. All Hebrew terms in the dataset are translated into their English equivalents for
ease of exposition.
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207diverging or converging, and so create newly evolved stances. A
relevant example is the answer one of the lesbian mothers gave in response
to the question, "How would you define your family status?" She said, "As
far as I'm concerned, it's possible to say married plus two." She evaluated
the term "family status" appearing in the question, and then considered the
interviewers' identity-heterosexual married mothers-and aligned her
answer with what "family status" typically means in heterosexual terms by
choosing the word "married." She then diverged from this concept,
explaining what "marriage" means for her: "The concept that is used...
I'll explain what is the nature of the relationship or the essence of the
relationship." This is where the text reflects whether the speaker perceives
herself as adhering to mainstream, conventional norms or pursuing an
"alternative" path.
In order to determine the thematic content of the interviews, a template
was created for each interview, divided into the four broad categories
mentioned above: general, pre-family-forming, family-internal, and family-
external. The answers to the questions in each category were examined in
terms of their direct and indirect indices. We tracked the vocabulary items,
presuppositions, and implicatures they contained, as well as the discourse
stance they reflected.
For ease of exposition, the present discussion focuses on a subset of the
indices analyzed: vocabulary items and implicatures. These were chosen
since they represent both overt and covert meanings that parents in
alternative families express when portraying their family situation. We
noted the explicit terminology parents selected for labeling family-related
notions, and analyzed the implicit ideas, beliefs, concepts, and emotions
underlying their statements. Such an analysis provides a window into the
reality of new-type families, as perceived by parents living in such settings.
VI. FINDINGS
Individuals who wish to create a family outside the mainstream context
of marriage have no straightforward option for conceiving children; as a
result, the emotional, mental, and financial resources spent in the process of
family formation are immense. Parents used terms like "complicated,"
"non-normative," "problematic in our society," and "no options," in
describing a range of painful experiences: being forced to contact bodies
such as "Alternative Parenting" or "New Family" in order to find a
potential candidate for joint parenting;20 8 having to interview and
207. See John W. DuBois, The Stance Triangle, in STANCETAKING IN DISCOURSE:
SUBJECTIVITY, EVALUATION, INTERACTION, 139 (Robert Englebretson ed., 2007)
(describing the use of stances in conversations).
208. See generally Alternative Parenting Israel, http://www.alp.org.il/index.htm (last
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sometimes even date prospective partners in order to get to know them
better; being rejected by a potential partner; or undergoing a host of
traumatic medical procedures for the purpose of insemination.2 °9
Interviewees aspire(d) to form families and articulated that desire using
language like "fantasy," "to have an heir," or "not be to be old and
childless." The last worry appears to be as basic among gay potential
parents as it is among heterosexuals. A biological lesbian mother phrased
it succinctly: "Having kids is not a demonstration or a form of opposition;
we simply want to have a family."21
Individuals' strong drive to become a parent against all odds makes
sense in the context of Israeli society, which cherishes the family institution
and perceives it as one of its most defining trademarks.21 It follows then,
that in such a society, members who create families are highly valued. This
fact is reflected in the sense of urgency expressed in some of the
interviews. Terms such as "biological clock" and a desire "not to miss the
train" were used to describe the interviewees' motivations for creating a
family, suggesting that a non-parent is perceived as someone who is not
fully fulfilled. In fact, some of the gay fathers in the sample defined family
forming as an opportunity to be perceived as "normal," "stable,"
"upgraded,, 21 2 and "doing something with your life," implying that having
a family in Israel is the conventional, expected, and publicly valued course
of personal development. Two of the gay interviewees told us explicitly
that after coming out of the closet to their mothers, who were at first
devastated by the news, they were then asked to promise them not to give
up having children.
When asked to define their family status, parents used a variety of terms
to label their particular family constellations, including "alternative
family," "two mothers," "same-sex parents," "groups," "partners," "family
unit," "situation," and "weird situation." This host of descriptions reflects
visited July 25, 2009); New Family, http://www.newfamily.org.il/text/english (last
visited July 25, 2009) (highlighting organizations whose mission is to help individuals
form families who otherwise do not wish, or are unable, to get married).
209. One of the biological lesbian mothers was even unable to recall any of the
details of her insemination. See New-Type Family Interviews, supra note 202.
210. One biological gay father explained that becoming a parent is a possibility to
mature and develop, an option not readily available for gay men, who are often deemed
non-suitable "parent material." Another non-biological gay father was told by a
member of his extended family that he would not become a parent since he is gay. See
New-Type Family Interviews, supra note 202.
211. AMIA LIEBLICH, SEDER NASHIM [WOMEN'S ORDER] (2003) (discussing the
notion of family in Israel through interviews with Israeli women, who live in different
family settings, e.g., single mothers, widows, and lesbians, among others).
212. The word in Hebrew is "meshudrag," the translation of which is "upgraded." It
is used in the sense of being "evolved"--a gay parent is more evolved than a gay man
with no children.
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a linguistic deficiency in describing the exact familial relations in new-type
families: the term "family" is simply inadequate to the task of accurately
describing these creative clans.
These findings tie in with the unique family-internal difficulties new-
type parents described in their interviews. The most salient obstacle seems
to be related to defining the scope of the family unit, which is not pre-
determined or straightforward in new-type families as it is in traditional
ones, as a basis for determining the range of responsibilities each parental
figure has towards the child. In the interviews with the lesbian mothers,
terminology such as "stay-at-home mom," "work full-time," and "the role
of the breadwinner" suggests that much like in heterosexual families,
earning power may determine how much time a parent spends with the
children, with income inversely proportional to amount of time spent with
children. Other interviewees painted a more complex picture of a
household in which it is not at all clear who may be considered immediate
family: the biological parents, all parent figures, or some combination.
References to "inner circle of me and the children," "outer-circle-their
father," and "beloved uncle" imply that parents in alternative families may
perceive their position as undefined and impermanent, an implicature
which goes hand-in-hand with the already noted absence of appropriate
terminology to describe their formal family status.
The problem of inadequate vocabulary also surfaced in the interviewees'
descriptions of their contact with various official bodies, such as tax
authorities, social security, and governmental offices. They identified
relatively few practical problems and focused instead on how such
institutions provide no options for new-type parents in choosing a label that
captures both their formal and psychological status. A biological gay
father complained that he has "no category" in official forms, that he is
forced to "add a rubric," suggesting that formally, their family status is not
recognized by the state as viable. Interviewees often referred to the
absence of an explicit label to capture their marital status and described
how they are compelled to characterize themselves as "single" in formal
contexts. One lesbian interviewee was actually married in a semi-religious
ceremony conducted by a female rabbi and including the exchange of
wedding bands. She perceives herself as being married and calls her
partner "my wife." Another biological lesbian mother said that she
introduces herself as being "unlawfully wedded" in order to capture the
difficulty she has expressing the authentic reality of her family relations.
Her words indicate her desire to inhabit a clear, recognizable status beyond
the context of her immediate family. 213 The same interviewee stated that
213. She stated: "I [would] love this status to say that I'm married.... These
[formalities] are the tools the public has to notice there are two [of us]." Her statement
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although she is legally defined by the government as a single mother, a
status that entitles her to certain social security benefits, she refuses, "on
principle," to receive any financial support for which she is eligible.214 She
demanded that the government provide what she termed "a social, external
truth" that would capture her family status, suggesting that the current
situation, even if financially favorable to her, fundamentally fails to satisfy
her desire to be legally recognized as a married lesbian mother. In order to
get around this gap, most of the interviewees noted that they had changed
their family name to include that of their partner in parenting, mainly for
the children's sake.215 Name changes are a drastic measure that parents in
alternative families are willing to take, though such a step may contradict in
some way their mental or emotional state, or even parts of their identity.
Moreover, it does not guarantee recognition of their family as a "family
unit."
The heterosexual women in our study, all of whom had children with gay
fathers, seemed less concerned with formal status. Their lack of anxiety
may result from their clearly defined legal status as "single mothers,,
216
which is how two of the three defined their family status. The third mother
referred to herself as "single" but noted that psychologically she feels as if
she has "a better family than most people." She is clearly focused on the
positive family dynamic of which she feels fortunate to be a part.
Indeed, all of our interviewees described good, solid, strong, loving,
emotional ties with their children, who were often referred to as being
"beloved," "attached," and "lucky." However, in describing their relations
with other family members, they exhibited far more variation. For
example, the heterosexual mothers and gay fathers who co-parented often
described their relationship by using phrases such as "good friends," "very
good relations," "special dynamic," and "friendship," all of which imply
deep and positive emotional investment. At the same time, some of the
descriptions contained terms such as "annoying," "disagreement," "lack of
trust," "trap," "takeover," and "permission," reflecting the difficulties such
family relations often raise with respect to logistics of sharing the child's
implies that marriage carries a certain formal status that reflects cultural affirmation
and that the pursuit for this cultural affirmation should be available to all humans,
including lesbians. See New-Type Family Interviews, supra note 202.
214. "I am married!" she declared, and continued, "This is what upsets me. You
know what pisses me off? THIS!" See New-Type Family Interviews, supra note 202.
215. One heterosexual mother, whose daughters bear their gay father's last name,
claimed that she felt it would help deal with deviations, although she is psychologically
not connected to the change. A similar statement was made by a non-biological lesbian
mother who felt mixed about changing her name but thought it was important for the
kids. See New-Type Family Interviews, supra note 202.
216. See The Single-Parent Families Act, 1992, S.H. 142 (defining a single parent as
an Israeli citizen who is not married, is without anyone known as her common-law
spouse, and whose child is in her custody).
2009]
592 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 17:3
time. Nonetheless, many interviewees mentioned the extreme measures
that new-type parents sometimes take in order to resolve conflict situations,
either by receiving help from friends and extended family members, or by
seeking professional help, including legal mediation or psychological
counseling, with the child's best interest in mind.21 7
The amount of love, care, and concern new-type parents show toward
their children is also reflected in the interviewees' descriptions of contracts
drafted for specifying exactly how their children would be raised. The
descriptions were long and detailed, including information regarding
visitation, sleeping arrangements, healthcare, finances, schooling, extra-
curricular activities, or, as one mother put it, "everything. '" 218  These
contracts demonstrate the careful planning, thorough evaluation, and
extensive consideration of the child's wellbeing, perhaps to a greater extent
than is usually found in heterosexual families. Many of the parents,
however, mentioned difficulties in adhering to the contracts, reflected in
their use of expressions such as "flexibility" and "degrees of freedom" in
interpreting clauses of the contract sometimes necessary after the child's
birth, since "a child is not an object" or "a robot., 21 9 Nonetheless, even
interviewees who described difficult breaches of contract, which resulted in
a loss of trust between parents, stated that the parties eventually reached
agreement together via discussion, mediation, legal intervention, or
psychological counseling.
An alternative family comes with what one of the interviewees termed
"additional colors," a difference that requires parents to explain to their
children their life choices, especially as they grow older. Parents expressed
a need to prepare their children for possible social reactions denying the
very existence of new-type families. One of the lesbian interviewees
217. One of the heterosexual mothers, whose relationship with her gay co-parent
was rocky at first, strongly recommended the use of professional counseling to ensure
that the child's basic needs are met. She was unable to manage without such help, even
though she and her partner in parenting are both employed as mental health
professionals. She emphasized the significance of resolving conflicts by comparing an
unborn child to a fruit, who must be remembered and whose needs must be considered,
so implying that a child is a product of love even when born into an alternative setting
and that parental commitment in such a setting is taken seriously even before the child
is conceived. See New-Type Family Interviews, supra note 202.
218. Another heterosexual mother mentioned that since both she and the gay father
with whom she had her daughters are secular Jews, they decided to include a clause in
the contract stating that if one of them decides to become an orthodox Jew, the other
parent would gain custody of the children. See New-Type Family Interviews, supra
note 202.
219. Much of the adaptation concerned sleeping arrangements of very young babies,
whose mothers were not able to part with them and let them spend the night over at
their fathers', as contracted. The mothers were described as "distraught," "anxious,"
and "throw[ing] a fit," in order to capture the way they reacted to the idea of leaving
their babies with their gay fathers overnight. See New-Type Family Interviews, supra
note 202.
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reported that she witnessed one of her daughters being told by a nanny in
the playground, "no, it's not possible to have a family with two mothers."
Situations of this type were described by parents as a "source of conflict"
for the child and a "tension in day-to-day life;" the parents described their
situations as "not the majority" or "a special kind of family," and all of
these terms imply that the children may have to grapple with the fact that
society's perceptions of their families may be at odds with their inner sense
of family. Some of the interviewees perceived familial discussions with
their children as opportunities to instill important social values, such as
"diversity" and "acceptance of others," and to help their children develop a
"broad world view." This attitude suggests that parents in new-type
families are well-equipped to handle issues of diversity, since they
inherently experience and are forced to cope with them early on.1
20
Moreover, they assert that when a child is born into a special kind of
family, in which he experiences love, care, and security, the fact that the
setting is nontraditional does not affect his happiness, or ability to grow up
into a self-confident, mature person.22'
Interviewees clearly expressed their sincere concern for the possible
ramifications their life choices might have on their children, using phrases
such as "dilemma," "courage," "to cope," "problem for the child," and
"burden." These suggest that, in a society where new-type families are not
always well received, the decision to have a child requires full commitment
on the parents' part as well as immense internal and social resources to
handle the child's potential stigmatization. Several of the interviewees
noted that commitment may have affected their choice of where to live-
many chose Tel Aviv-in seeking a "liberal," "tolerant," "pluralistic"
environment, in which they would feel comfortable raising their children
and where their children would be less likely to encounter social rejection.
The social problems to which the new-type parents we interviewed
alluded were quite subtle. They had little experience with blunt, negative
social reactions to their family settings and did not portray a sense of
hostility, lack of acceptance, or alienation. In fact, a non-biological lesbian
mother stated that her status as a parent has never been questioned by
anyone from healthcare providers, teachers, her children's friends' parents,
or her partner's extended family, and that she felt "very fortunate" not
220. See Clarke & Kitzinger, Talk Shows, supra note 170, at 210-11 (discussing
alternative families as a benefit when teaching diversity).
221. See James C. Black, Same-Sex Parents & Their Children's Development, in
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVOLUTION IN AMERICA 95
(Donald J. Cantor et al., eds., Wesleyan University Press 2006) (describing positive
effects of same-sex parenting); BILL ESKRIDGE & DARREN SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE:
FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? 197-202 (2006) (reviewing the benefits of same-sex
partnerships to family life, as evidenced in Scandinavian countries).
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having faced that "hurdle." Her words acknowledge that the world outside
the alternative family often does call into question the parental status of the
non-biological parent, and that attitude, or the fear of encountering it, may
be felt within many circles.
Parents did describe what they saw as inauthentic expressions of social
acceptance. For example, a non-biological lesbian mother spoke of being
treated as "society's token flag" on school celebrations of Family Day,
implying that acceptance of her family setting by the school is designed to
portray the institution as liberal, rather than to truly expand the social
boundaries of the community it serves. Instead, she would have liked to be
regarded as a regular family "throughout the year."
222
In general, when parents were asked to describe the gap between the
existing and ideal state of affairs, all expressed a basic desire for a simpler
reality in an accepting environment. They used expressions such as "huge
burden," "radar is always on," and "ad nauseam explanations," to describe
current situations, suggesting that parents in new-type families feel subject
to constant public scrutiny. They described a wish to experience a different
public perception of their family life in a society that "banishes stigma,"
"dissolves prejudices," and which considers their families "completely
regular," "more normative," or even "takes them for granted" as parents.
They expressed a desire for a society in which "diversity" is valued and
"appreciation" towards alternative families is expressed, in contrast to what
they experience and observe in day-to-day life.223 Some interviewees could
not envision such a social transformation, saying, "it'll never happen,"
while others were more optimistic and expressed more "faith" in the
"gradual, incremental process" of acceptance. A biological lesbian mother
compared the classic family to a rigid mold, suggesting that society is
simply not yet equipped to deal with families that do not fit that mold.
"The framework no longer exists, it's not suitable anymore. The puzzle is
different now, it has more pieces." These sentiments suggest that parents
in new-type families are seeking recognition.
222. Similar implicit references to tokenism were found in other interviews as well,
where phrases such as "anecdote," "a turn on," "such a nice idea that I told my
husband, as long as it does not concern [our] own son," and "the town's lesbian
family," were used to portray people's reaction to an alternative family. See New-Type
Family Interviews, supra note 202.
223. A biological gay father told of how proud he felt receiving a gift from an old
uncle of his in honor of his baby's birth with a card stating "I commend you for your
wisdom and foresight," implying that the creativity with which the child was brought
into this world was a source of joy and even admiration. One of the gay biological
fathers mentioned that he has a problem with the prima facie assumption of being a
straight father. Thus, when going with his daughter to the park, it is important for him
to position himself as a non-heterosexual married father, in order to reject society's
assumptions. He feels asserting his identity and family role is necessary ?or the sake of
gay men who are not fully accepted by their families and friends. See New-Type
Family Interviews, supra note 202.
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VII. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS IN TERMS OF RECOGNITION
New-type families do not suffer historical, economic, and political
marginalization in Israel. However, their desire for recognition should be
considered in the social context within which they are made and the
particular political circumstances in Israel. Nancy Fraser's emphasis on
status illuminates an important dimension of the experience of the
alternative family. Since Israeli institutions do not officially recognize
new-type families, those who create them are not regarded or treated as
peers, worthy of participating fully in social life. Thus, the conditions of
reciprocal recognition and status equality 24 are not fulfilled.
Our findings clearly indicate that new-type families consider themselves
to be real families. Children in alternative families receive unconditional
love and care from their biological parents, their parents' life partners, and
their extended or chosen family members. The emotional resources
invested in these children are exceptional, with parent figures showing
active involvement in their children's life in ways not typically observed in
classic families.225 Moreover, the decision to have a child in new-type
families is always a conscious one, with an eye to the consequences the
family composition may have on the unborn child and careful attention to
protecting that child. Highly detailed contracts are common. Such
contracts have often been compared to the kind drafted for couples
divorcing, giving rise to the claim that parents in alternative family settings
do not have their children's best interest in mind since they are
intentionally placing them in a divorce-like reality. However, this
comparison misses some fundamental differences between divorced
couples and new-type families. Divorce is a new, changed situation
imposed, often traumatically, on a family. A new-type family is a given
setting into which a child is born, which remains stable and supporting, as
long as the agreement is observed. This adherence has been found to be
extremely challenging in some cases, resulting in head-on conflicts
between the parents, who, nonetheless, made the utmost efforts to arrive at
a resolution through mediation or psychological counseling. The parties'
objective is to build a strong family structure for the child, rather than to
dissolve a relationship that no longer works, as is the case with divorce.
Thus, in the face of even the harshest problems, there is great willingness
on each side to overcome so that the child continues to benefit from
supportive, cooperative parent figures. In addition, parents in new-type
families might feel that in the absence of legal background and clearly
224. Fraser, supra note 136, at 24 (arguing that the institutionalization in marital law
of heterosexist cultural norms denies parity of participation to gays and lesbians).
225. For example, some interviews revealed that both parents take the time to attend
parent-teacher conferences at the school together.
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defined roles of their principals, it is necessary to define contractual
activities more formally.
The extent to which new-type parents feel confident as parents has been
linked to their self-acceptance and sense of wholeness as people. Parents
with a strong sense of self describe their family setting as a natural habitat
for developing values of pluralism and mutual respect. Perhaps since
creating a new-type family entails "coming out of the closet," most
interviewees identified as self-confident and self-assured. It is interesting
to note that one of the heterosexual mothers claimed that she too "came out
of the closet" when she shared with others her decision to remain
unmarried and create a family with a gay male partner.
At a societal level, the findings suggest that parents in new-type families
neither experience social rejection nor suffer alienation, which is perhaps
attributable to the fact that most participants live in Tel Aviv, one of the
most liberal and progressive cities in Israel. Most had trouble recalling
negative reactions from others regarding their family setting, suggesting
that social aversion has not proved a problem for them.
However, the absence of formal status and the non-recognition to which
it gives rise have emerged as critical problems. All of the interviewees
alluded to a gap between their formal status to the outside world and their
status in their own minds, a gap that interferes with the development of
cognitive self-respect. A person evaluates herself in relation to society,
examines the rights assigned to her compared to others, and thus develops a
sense of social recognition. In Israel, however, members of new-type
families face many unclear legal situations. For example, although it is
important for same-sex couples to create a cohabiting agreement,226 there
are legal limitations on their ability to sign a binding prenuptial
agreement. 227 Some of the interviewees also mentioned their fear that the
signed contract is not enforceable, since they do not know whether a family
226. See THE NEW FAMILY ORGANIZATION, THE NEW FAMILY GUARD 19-22 (2007)
(showing that while signing an official co-habiting arrangement is always
recommended for non-married couples, it is even more important for same-sex couples
who need to make special efforts to convince the various institutions that their
relationship is in good faith).
227. See Family Court Act, 5755 1995, (Isr.) S.H. 393; The Proprietary
Relationships Between Couples Act (1973), S.H. 267 ("the 'Prenuptial Act"'). Parents
in alternative family settings can have a "family agreement" as permitted under the
Family Court Act. However, for the sake of arranging financial and other related issues
between couples, agreements based on the Prenuptial Act are the more popular
instrument used frequently by heterosexual couples. Agreements according to the
Family Court Act on the other hand are a side route. Though the practical implications
of either agreement are the same, the ability to arrange a prenuptial has symbolic value.
Moreover, the presumption underlying Prenuptial Act agreements is of shared
proprietorship. Thus, if the statute is applicable to same-sex couples, it might lead to
far-reaching consequences where such couples without an arrangement are presumed to
share their property the same as married or unmarried heterosexual couples.
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court can approve an arrangement for parenting a child.228 Thus, in the
absence of a clearly definable legal status, such parents cannot enjoy the
same rights other parents enjoy, and they subsequently suffer non-
recognition at the social level. 9
This cry for recognition fits within the broader context of Israeli reality,
in which members of new-type families feel unrecognized or
unacknowledged. For example, when the Family Court decided to allow
two lesbian mothers to adopt each other's children, the two women
responded: "Finally, the state officially recognized us as a family., 230 Arel,
their teenage son, added: "Avital is my mother as much as Tal. We are
family, and the decision will not change our daily life. But with respect to
the state, it makes a big difference. This recognition is needed for all the
ministries. Until today, we were not considered a family by the state.",
231
Arel clearly perceives both women as his parents, as demonstrated in the
tree diagram he used to portray his family structure.232 However, he was
forced to label Avital as his "father," for lack of an appropriate term.233
Members of new-type families aspire to experience their family life
authentically. They are not interested in false affection, pity, sympathy, or
other forms of insincere social acceptance. They simply wish to exercise
their basic human right to become parents. In Israel, a family's authenticity
derives from its resemblance to the traditional opposite-sex-based family.
Recognition emphasizes the need to respect people's different choices as
authentic. Russell Lord, one of the appellants in the Supreme Court case
that approved the registration of five gay couples married in Canada as
"married" by the Israeli Ministry of Interior,234 commented:
228. Since such agreements involve an unborn child, the validity of the
arrangements concerning her is questionable. Courts decide according to the best
interest of the specific child and not according to an agreement drafted prior to her
birth. In addition, socially speaking, there is little to no awareness of the significance
of approving such agreements (albeit their legal complexity).
229. Cf Laura Masnerus, Child Born to Lesbian Couple Will Have 2 Mothers
Listed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2006, at N.Y. Region, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/16/nyregion/16mother.html? r=3&oref-slogin
(presenting an example of a legal development that approved thie listing of two lesbians
as the parents on the birth certificate of their newborn in a decision by the Family Court
in Burlington County, New Jersey, which will grant both mothers full parental rights
and further the cause of recognition for gay and lesbian parents).
230. Adoption (TA) 48/97 Jarus-Hakak v. Att'y Gen. [2006] IsrDC.
231. See Tal Rozner, Historia: Zug Halesbiot Eimetz Rishmit et Yaldeihen (History:
Lesbian Couple Officially Adopted their Children), YNET, Feb. 12, 2006,
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3214763,00.html.
232. See Genealogy, http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.ancestry.com/-pnlowe/
loewenheim/g0000084.html, (last visited July 25, 2009) (illustrating Arel Jarus-
Hakak's genealogy).
233. Id. (displaying that Arel has a hyphenated surname, combining both of his
mothers' ancestries).
234. HCJ 3045/05 The Ass'n. for Civil Rights in Isr. v. Chief Registrar of
2009]
JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 17:3
All that we asked for is simply social recognition of us as a couple, equal
in all respects to any other couple. We wanted to subjugate our shared
responsibility to life like any other married couple and also enjoy the
benefits that such couples enjoy. We wanted the common and normative
track of every married couple, including the advantages and benefits
involved. Therefore, the normal and expected track for us as a couple
was to choose to get married. Canada granted us the option to fulfill our




Aev.v Gross argued that this decision to approve the registration is a
part oWan attempt to "normalize" gays and lesbians into the socially
desirable pattern, namely, "marriage," which is perceived in Israeli society
as the ultimate form of self-fulfillment.237 However, the appellants view
marriage and legal registration as the realization of their personal choice,
rather than an obligation; they feel that they are no longer restricted in
choosing their way of life, whether or not they opt to model their own
relationships after traditional ones.
Parents in new-type families need societal symbols, such as clearly
definable parent labels, acknowledging their family units' legitimacy. In
other words, what gay parents want is the opportunity to be viewed as
valuable and valued members of society who contribute equally to Israel's
social fabric. They wish to free themselves of the paradox Israeli society
imposes on them, simultaneously compelling them to become parents and
failing to view alternative family configurations as legitimate families.
238
Establishing a sense of belonging requires a supportive community,
networking, a sense of security, and a feeling of connectedness. Such
security is often the result of a strong sense of a shared sameness,
something of which gays and lesbians are often deprived when they are
marginalized as members of gay communities. Most of the interviewees in
the sample stated that they do not feel they belong to a specific gay/lesbian
community. The very fact of becoming a parent shifts adults' focus to their
Population, Ministry of Interior [2006] IsrSC.
235. Natasha, Kol Kala Vekol Kala, Kol Chatan Vekol Chatan (Voice of Bride and
Bride, Voice of Groom and Groom), HAZMAN HAVAROD (PINK TIME), Dec. 2006, at 14.
236. The Ass 'n. for Civil Rights in Isr., HCJ 3045/05.
237. See Aeyal Gross, Does a Homosexual Have to Get Married Now Too?, YNET
OPINIONS, July 5, 2007, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3330933,00.html.
238. See LEE WALZER, BETWEEN SODOM AND EDEN: A GAY JOURNEY THROUGH
TODAY'S CHANGING ISRAEL, 179 (Columbia University Press 2000) (noting that gays
and lesbians are not exempt from the pressure to marry and have children in Israel,
which stems partially from Judaism's emphasis on the family and partially from what is
perceived as almost a national duty to procreate in light of the Arab-Israeli conflict).
Overall, extreme pressure is also placed on individuals in Israel to be married in a
religious ceremony-which is still the main, legally recognized form of marriage-and
to have children shortly after, in the spirit of the Jewish Halacha.
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children's wellbeing, a change fostered not when parents feel isolated on
the basis of distinctive traits, but rather when they feel accepted as an
integral part of society. This suggests that, at the state level, the conditions
for social esteem are not met, and as a result gay and lesbian parents do not
enjoy solidarity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, the reality of new-type families in Israel, apparent even to
the seven-year-old character in the children's book described earlier, 239 has
yet to penetrate Israel as manifested in its social and legal regimes. In
Israeli reality, gay and lesbian individuals form new families despite the
difficulties involved, and they provide their children with love and
emotional support as in any other family. Yet, at the societal level, they
experience passive tolerance at best or considerable objection at worst, as
the state continues to close its eyes to the revolution in family formation
that has taken place in recent years.240 The state must take a stand and
promote contested conceptions of the good. Liberal tolerance is not
enough.241 Only legal recognition of the new-type families, by enabling
marriage, adoption, and prenuptial agreements, can establish social esteem
and achieve "solidarity." The power of gay families lies in their ability to
reshape the political, emotional, and legal understanding of what family is.
The prerequisite for building a sense of positive difference is recognition
from the state, which will further shape social attitudes.
The aim of this paper is by no means to reject the liberal notions of
individualism and autonomy. Like Fraser, we perceive recognition as a
matter of justice. Justice requires that "everyone has an equal right to
,,242pursue social esteem under fair conditions of equal opportunity.
Personal traits, temperament, and individual attributes influence the way
individuals and families establish their identities, and hence affect the way
we treat one another. However, since we postulate that the main struggle
of new-type families revolves around recognition rather than equality, we
239. See ATLAS & MISHALI, supra note I and accompanying text.
240. Cf Ruth Eglash, Study. 40,000 Children Have No Paternal Ties, JERUSALEM
POST, Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=l 162378407955&
pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter (reporting on the growing number of
children being born in Israel who do not know the identity of their fathers).
241. Cf Chai R. Feldblum, The Limitation of Liberal Neutrality Arguments, in
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPs-A STUDY OF NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 55, 74 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenes
eds., 2001) ("[G]overnmental recognition of same-sex marriage will be difficult to
achieve based solely on principles of toleration and fairness. In all likelihood, such
recognition will require an explicit acknowledgment of a clash of moral principles, and
a persuasive argument as to why gay relationships are as morally positive for
individuals and for society as are heterosexual relationships.").
242. Fraser, supra note 136, at 28.
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assert that liberal neutrality falls short of capturing the complexity of the
situation and fails to provide a sufficient answer.
Understanding the connection between recognition and dignity is
essential to fulfilling fundamental rights. If new-type families are not
recognized as families, they cannot enjoy the right to family or to equal
protection of the law. One non-biological gay father expressed his desire
"to belong to the child-raising community," indicating his deep
commitment to parenting despite his status as an outsider. Recognition
promotes a world in which he already is, rather than just wants to be part of
the "parent community."
